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In 1986, California voters overwhelmingly1 approved the Safe
Drinking Water and Toxic Enforcement Act of 1986,2 an initiative bet-
ter known as Proposition 65. Voters passed the initiative to address
the failure of government institutions to protect Californians from
health threats posed by hazardous chemicals.3 Specifically, voters de-
clared their rights to safe drinking water, to information about chemi-
cal exposures, and to strict enforcement of toxics laws.4 The statute
has received extraordinary national attention for its innovative regula-
tory approaches, and has been alternatively labeled revolutionary5
and wildly irresponsible.6
Although the statute imposes both a warning obligation and a
discharge prohibition, its centerpiece has proven to be the require-
ment that businesses provide warnings whenever their products or ac-
tivities expose persons to toxic chemicals. While such warning and
information disclosure requirements7 are not new, they have become
1. Sixty-three percent of the voters statewide favored Proposition 65. Richard Si-
mon, Bradley Handed Only L.A.-Area Defeat in Valley, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 6, 1986, at B8.
2. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 25249.5-.13 (West 1992 & Supp. 1995).
3. Safe Drinking Water and Toxic Enforcement Act of 1986, Proposition 65, § 1,
1986 Cal. Stat. A-219.
4. Id. at § 1(a)-(c).
5. Lead in Ceramicware and CrystaL" An Avoidable Risk Hearing Before the Ad Hoc
Subcomm. on Consumer and Environmental Affairs of the Senate Comm. on Governmental
Affairs, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1992) [hereinafter Hearings] (testimony of David Roe,
Senior Attorney, Environmental Defense Fund: "[Proposition 65] is nothing less than a
quiet revolution in the ability of law to grapple with some ... difficult issues .... ).
6. See Leslie Roberts, A Corrosive Fight Over California's Toxics Law, 243 SCIENCE
306, 307 (1989) (reporting that industry calls Proposition 65 "duplicative, unnecessary, ex-
pensive and a nightmare to comply with," while biochemist Bruce Ames calls it a "thor-
oughly silly law, with an enormous cost and no gain in public health."). Id. at 306. During
the campaign, opponents of the initiative argued that the statute would shut down the
state's agricultural industry. See ARGUMENT AGAINST PROPOSITION 65, in CALIFORNIA
BALLOT PAMPHLET, GENERAL ELECTION, Nov. 4, 1986, at 55 [hereinafter BALLOT PAM-
PHLET] ("Many common fertilizers, weed and pest control materials ... would be effec-
tively banned for most farmers. Farmers may even have to stop irrigating."). Some
opponents argued that the effects would spread even further and that the initiative would
"bring chaos to our state's court system, cripple our economy, and send California's tech-
nology and business improvements back some 20 years .... BRUCE H. JENNINGS, SEN-
ATE OFFICE OF RESEARCH, REPORT TO THE STATE SENATE OF 1990, CALIFORNIA'S
EXPERIENCE WITH PROPOSITION 65: IMPLEMENTING THE SAFE DRINKING WATER AND
Toxic ENFORCEMENT ACT, No. 498-S, at 27 (1990) [hereinafter CALIFORNIA'S EXPERI-
ENCE] (quoting remarks of California Grape and Tree Fruit League).
7. Regulatory schemes requiring manufacturers to provide health or safety warnings
or disclose other product information include FDA's labeling requirements for pharmaceu-
tical products, EPA's pesticide labeling program, warnings for cigarettes and saccharin, and
EPA's warning programs for homeowners' exposure to radon and citizens' exposures to
hazardous waste. W. KIP Viscusi, REFORMING PRODUCS LIABILITY 133 (1991). For
background on federal labeling laws, see SUSAN G. HADDEN, READ THE LABEL: REDUC-
ING RISK BY PROVIDING INFORMATION (1986).
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increasingly popular and important over the past fifteen years, most
notably with the adoption of worker and community right-to-know
provisions. 8 This trend is likely to continue, especially given the cur-
rent legislative movement to scale back environmental regulation and
the increased interest in market-based incentives as an alternative to
traditional direct regulation.
Proposition 65 represents the most ambitious attempt by any
state to regulate hazardous chemical exposure through information
disclosure rather than by direct mandate. Its coverage is broader than
that of other laws, encompassing exposures in diverse environmental
media. The implementing regulations promulgated by the California
Health and Welfare Agency (HWA) (now the Office of Environmen-
tal Health Hazard Assessment (OEHHA)) require warnings for con-
sumer product exposures, 9  occupational exposures, 10  and
environmental exposures." Thus, Proposition 65's reach extends to
everything from shoe polish, newly constructed homes, and food and
wine, to chemicals in the workplace and factory emissions.
This Article analyzes how Proposition 65's warning requirement
has fared in practice. Proposition 65 has had mixed success in realizing
its underlying statutory goals of providing individuals with sufficient
8. E.g., U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration's (OSHA) Hazardous
Communication Standard (HCS), 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200 (1994); Emergency Planning and
Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986 (EPCRA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001-11050 (1988 &
Supp. V 1993). See SUSAN G. HADDEN, A CITIZEN'S RIGHT TO KNOW: RISK COMMUNICA-
TION AND PUBLIC POLICY 22 (1989) [hereinafter HADDEN, A CmZEN'S RIGHT TO KNOW]
(listing cities and states with worker right-to-know laws). See generally Michael D. Green,
When Toxic Worlds Collide: Regulatory and Common Law Prescriptions for Risk Commu-
nication, 13 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 209 (1989). See also Joel Hirschorn, Pollution Preven-
tion Comes of Age, U. GA. L. REv. 325, 337 (1995) (stating that environmentalists have
shifted public policy away from reliance on conventional regulations and toward requiring
companies to report information and plans for waste reduction); Susan G. Hadden, Regu-
lating Product Risks Through Consumer Information, 47 J. Soc. ISSUES 93, 96 (1991) [here-
inafter Hadden, Regulating Product Risks] (reporting that information provisions are the
favored option for regulating risks from consumer products); Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co.,
115 S. Ct. 1585, 1590 (1995) (observing that the trend in federal regulation of consumer
products favors greater disclosure of information). Other recent federal statutes mandat-
ing the disclosure of information include the Alcohol Labeling Act of 1988, Pub. L. No.
100-690, 102 Stat. 4518 (1988); the Nutritional Labeling Act and Education Act of 1990,
Pub. L. No. 101-535, 104 Stat. 2353 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21
U.S.C.); the Pollution Prevention Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 13101-13109 (Supp. V 1993)
(requiring companies to report information about plans for waste reduction); the Clean
Air Act Amendments of 1990 §§ 611(b), (d)(1), 42 U.S.C. §§ 7671j(b), (d)(1) (Supp. V
1993) (requiring products containing ozone-depleting chemicals to include warning state-
ment that product contains a substance which harms public health and environment by
destroying ozone in the upper atmosphere); and the Residential Lead-Based Paint Hazard
Reduction Act § 1018(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 4852d(a)(1) (Supp. V 1993) (requiring disclosure
of lead-based paint hazards in sale or rental of all private housing).
9. CAL. CODE REGS., tit. 26, § 22-12601(b) (1995).
10. Id. § 22-12601(c).
11. Id. § 22-12601(d).
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information to make meaningful choices and reducing exposure to
toxic chemicals. The statute has been largely ineffective in promoting
informed choice because of sparse statutory guidance and inadequate
implementing regulations for its warning provisions. The lack of ade-
quate regulatory criteria has also contributed to overwarning by en-
abling businesses to provide vague and uninformative warnings that
recipients will likely ignore. However, in the consumer marketplace,
where substitute chemicals are available, Proposition 65 has en-
couraged significant product reformulation. The Act has also helped
to reduce toxic air emissions and other environmental exposures, the
result of increased industry scrutiny of its processes and concern about
negative publicity. Its weakest impact has been in the workplace,
where it largely has been subsumed by existing worker hazard com-
munication programs.
Part II of this Article provides general background about Propo-
sition 65's provisions. Part III discusses the various rationales under-
lying information disclosure laws such as Proposition 65, and the
statute's principal objectives. Part IV then analyzes the extent to
which warnings provided by businesses have achieved the statute's
goals. It first evaluates how effectively these warnings communicate
to the public the information necessary to promote informed decision-
making and satisfy the public's "right to know" in light of general
principles of cognitive psychology and risk communication. It then
analyzes the extent to which Proposition 65 warnings, or the statutory
warning requirement more generally, have induced toxics reductions.
This Part also considers whether the statute has promoted overwarn-
ing. Part V sets forth specific recommendations for improving the ef-
fectiveness of current warnings.
I
STATUTORY PROVISIONS OF PROPOSITION 65
A. Overview of Proposition 65 Warning Requirements
Proposition 65 applies to a group of chemicals listed by the State
of California as known carcinogens or reproductive toxicants. 12 Over
500 carcinogenic substances and 153 reproductive toxicants13 have
been listed under Proposition 65.14 In part, the statute prohibits a per-
12. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25249.6 (West 1992 & Supp. 1995).
13. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 26, § 22-12000(b),(c) (1995).
14. An expedited procedure applies for bringing chemicals within the statute's cover-
age. The Governor is required to publish a list of chemicals known to the State to cause
cancer or reproductive toxicity, a process not subject to the California Administrative Pro-
cedure Act. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25249.8(a),(e) (West 1992). The statute
further mandates that chemicals which previously have been found to cause cancer or re-
productive toxicity by certain other government agencies or authoritative scientific bodies
1996]
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son in the course of doing business from "knowingly" discharging or
releasing any listed chemical "into water or onto or into land where
such chemical passes or will probably pass into any source of drinking
water."' 15 Proposition 65 also imposes a far-reaching warning require-
ment: businesses must provide a "clear and reasonable" warning prior
to "knowingly and intentionally" exposing any individual to a listed
chemical. "Knowingly" is defined as knowledge that a discharge of or
exposure to a listed chemical is occurring, although it does not require
knowledge that the exposure or discharge is unlawful.16 "Intention-
ally" is not defined by regulation, but is likely to be interpreted as
intent to commit an act that results in exposure.
17
The statute applies to all private businesses with ten or more em-
ployees,' 8 and exemptions to the warning requirement are very lim-
ited. Only exposures to carcinogens that pose "no significant risk" of
cancer, or to reproductive toxicants that are below 1/1000th of the No
Observable Effect Level (NOEL) for that chemical, are exempt from
the warning requirement.a9
Although the statute does not define the "no significant risk"
level for carcinogens, implementing regulations have defined it as one
excess cancer case per 100,000 persons exposed for a lifetime.20 The
must automatically be listed under the statute. See id. § 25249.8(a),(b). As a result of this
expedited process, the State has developed the most comprehensive list of carcinogens of
any government agency. William S. Pease, Identifying Chemical Hazards for Regulation:
The Scientific Basis and Regulatory Scope of California's Proposition 65 List of Carcino-
gens and Reproductive Toxicants, 3 RIsK 127, 130 (1992). See also infra note 36.
15. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25249.5 (West 1992). Very few enforcement
actions solely involving the discharge prohibition have been filed. See State of California
Dep't of Justice, Office of the Attorney General, Proposition 65 Litigation (Oct. 26, 1994)
[hereinafter Prop. 65 Litigation] (unofficial summary compiled and updated by the Attor-
ney General's office). For a discussion of why this provision has had little impact to date,
see Susan G. Jordan, Enforcement of California's Prop 65: The First 65 Months, 38-40
(1995) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
16. CAL. CODE REoS. tit. 26, § 22-12201(d) (1995).
17. See Order Denying Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment, Citizens for a Better
Environment v. Sawyer of Napa, Inc., No. 61687 (Napa County Super. Ct. Dec. 13, 1991),
slip op. at 6 (interpretation of "intentionally" to mean voluntary or deliberate acts or omis-
sions is consistent with the goals of statutes designed to protect public health). The order
issued after the trial in the case did not adopt this definition of "intentionally," but the
court's discussion of the term is rather muddled. See id., Statement of Decision, I l(b)(8),
(9) (May 28, 1992). The case was affirmed in an unpublished decision that did not address
this issue. Citizens for a Better Environment v. Sawyer of Napa, Inc., No. A058829 (Ct.
App. Apr. 21, 1994). The regulations that define "knowingly" make clear that negligent
acts are covered by the statute. See CAL. CODE REDS. tit. 26, § 22-12201(d) (1995) (act or
omission does not violate statute where it has occurred "through misfortune or accident
and without evil design, intention or negligence").
18. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25249.11(b) (West 1992).
19. Id. § 25249.10(c). The warning requirement also does not apply to exposures that
take place less than twelve months subsequent to the listing of the chemical in question.
Id. § 25249.10(b).
20. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 26, § 22-12703(b) (1995).
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statute sets the thousandfold safety factor for reproductive toxicants.
Regulations also specify the exposure levels that satisfy the "no signif-
icant risk" level and the 1/1000th of the NOEL for certain chemicals.21
They further detail methods for determining these levels in instances
where the State has not set a specific level.22 These methods reflect
standard risk assessment methodology. 23 While critics have fre-
quently faulted Proposition 65 for dealing with marginal risks, the
warning threshold for carcinogens is consistent with or less stringent
than levels for many other regulated exposures, and was a deliberate
compromise between levels favored by industry advocates and envi-
ronmental groups.24 Moreover, many exposures subject to the statute
pose risks well above the warning threshold.25
21. See id. §§ 22-12705, 22-12805. Businesses remain free to develop their own
numeric standards for these chemicals provided they use methods of equal scientific valid-
ity. Id. §§ 22-12701(a), 22-12801(a).
22. Id. §§ 22-12703(a), 22-12711, 22-12803. In addition to these methods, businesses
are free to use other risk assessment methodologies of comparable scientific validity. Id.
§§ 22-12701(a), 22-12801(a).
23. Kenneth W. Kizer et al., Sound Science in the Implementation of Public Policy, 260
JAMA 951, 954 (1988) (arguing that risk assessment methods allow for maximal use of
valid scientific data).
24. Id. at 954. See Ingredient Communication Council v. Lungren, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d
216, 224 n.8 (Ct. App. 1992) (stating that the warning level is less stringent than the thresh-
olds used by other regulatory agencies to impose substantive restrictions on carcinogens);
40 C.F.R. § 131.36 (1994) (EPA criteria for priority toxic pollutants set at levels based on
cancer risk to humans of one in one million).
25. This is true for all types of exposures subject to the statute:
(1)Consumer product exposures
Cigars and pipe tobacco products, for which Proposition 65 warnings but no federal
warnings are required, pose risks comparable to those of cigarettes. See JUDITH A. Dou-
VILLE, ACIVE AND PASSIVE SMOKING HAZARDS IN THE WORKPLACE 21 (1990). Second-
hand smoke poses cancer risks of approximately 1 x 10'. Review of the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency's Tobacco and Smoke Study: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Specialty
Crops and Natural Resources of the House Comm. on Agriculture, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 9
(1993) (statement of William H. Farland, Director, Office of Health and Environmental
Assessment, U.S. EPA). Paint strippers containing methylene chloride result in exposures
ranging from 114 to 180,000 times the no significant risk level. Todd Woody, Painted Into
A Corner, RECORDER, Mar. 16, 1992, at 1, 16. The risks from correction fluid products
containing trichloroethylene were 500 times above the warning cutoff. Edward G. Weil,
Proposition 65 Enforcement Activities and Policies of the Attorney General, 6 PROP 65
NEWS, Feb. 1992, at 48, 50.
(2)Environmental exposures
Emissions of ethylene oxide (Eto) from several facilities in Los Angeles exposed hun-
dreds of thousands of persons above the warning threshold, some at levels over 100 times
the warning level. Jill Stewart, 4 Sterilization Firms Sued On Emissions of Carcinogenic
Gas, L.A. TIMES, July 19, 1990, at Al, A29. Eto emissions from a spice manufacturer in
Santa Maria resulted in an increase in cancer risk of 278 per 100,000 persons (equal to 278
times the warning level). William S, Pease, Chemical Hazards and the Public's Right-to-
Know: How Effective is California's Proposition 65?, 33 ENVIRONMENT 12, 18 (1991) [here-
inafter Pease, Chemical Hazards]. Hexavalent chromium emissions from an aerospace
manufacturer in Los Angeles produced risks close to 200 x 10-1 (impacting tens of
thousands of persons). Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Defend-
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Although the warning requirement is central to the statute, warn-
ings themselves were given scant attention by the drafters of Proposi-
tion 65. The statute does not define the term "warning," nor does it
specifically discuss what a warning should look like. The statute pro-
vides only the following general guidance, explaining that a warning:
need not be provided separately to each exposed individual and may
be provided by general methods such as labels on consumer products,
inclusion of notices in mailings to water customers, posting of notices,
placing notices in public news media, and the like, provided that the
warning accomplished is clear and reasonable.
26
Thus, the task of implementing this key statutory provision was left to
be developed through HWA regulations.27 Given the generality of
the statutory language, the HWA had considerable discretion in draft-
ing warning provisions. It incorporated some of the general warning
methods suggested by the statute, borrowed language from other fed-
eral labeling laws,28 and improvised elsewhere. The agency's efforts
were also shaped significantly by then-Governor George
Deukmejian's hostility toward the statute. This hostility led the State,
under intense pressure from regulated industry, to attempt unsuccess-
fully to limit the reach of the statute in several key areas. 29
ants' Demurrer to First Amended Complaint, People v. McDonnell Douglas Corp. (Los
Angeles County Super. Ct. filed Oct. 9, 1992) (No. BC055494).
(3)Workplace exposures
Occupational exposures subject to Proposition 65 warnings may be as high as 3 x 103
for benzene, 1 x 103 for nickel, and 2.6 x 10W for vinyl chloride. William S. Pease et al., Risk
Assessment for Carcinogens Under California's Proposition 65, 10 RIsK ANALYSIS 255,262-
63 (1990).
26. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25249.11(f) (West 1992 & Supp. 1995).
27. Then-Governor George Deukmejian designated the HWA as the lead agency for
adopting regulations that "implement the provisions of [Proposition 65] [and] further its
purposes." See icL § 25249.12 (West 1992). In 1991, this authority was transferred to the
Office of Environmental Health Hazard Assessment ("OEHHA") within Cal/EPA.
28. See e.g., 21 C.F.R. § 331.1(c)(2)(V)(1994) (warnings for over-the-counter drugs).
29. Governor Deukmejian originally refused to include animal carcinogens on the
Proposition 65 list despite the clear statutory directive to include all chemicals identified as
carcinogens by the International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC), which include
animal carcinogens. The HWA largely exempted from the warning requirement carcino-
gens in products that comply with the federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act. The HWA
also refused to utilize the statutory provision which provides for mandatory listing of
chemicals determined to be carcinogens or reproductive toxicants by scientific bodies iden-
tified as "authoritative" by the State's qualified experts. Finally, the California Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Standards Board refused to incorporate the warning provisions of
Proposition 65 into the State's Occupational Safety and Health (OSHA) Plan and thereby
shield it from claims of preemption by the U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Adminis-
tration's Hazard Communication Standard. All four of these actions were successfully
challenged by labor and environmental groups. See AFL-CIO v. Deukmejian, 260 Cal.
Rptr. 479 (Ct. App. 1989); AFL-CIO v. Deukmejian, No. 502541 (Sacramento County
Super. Ct. filed May 31, 1988); AFL-CIO v. Deukmejian, No. 359223 (Sacramento County
Super. Ct. filed June 22, 1988); Cal. Labor Fed'n v. Occupational Safety & Health Stan-
dards Bd., 271 Cal. Rptr. 310 (Ct. App. 1990).
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The regulations adopted by HWA differentiate among three
broadly drawn categories of exposure: consumer products exposures,
occupational exposures, and environmental exposures. 30 A "con-
sumer product exposure" results from the reasonably foreseeable use
of a consumer good or from receiving a consumer service.31 An "oc-
cupational exposure" is an exposure by an employer to an employee
in the workplace. 32 An "environmental exposure" is any other type of
exposure, covering the range of exposures that "may foreseeably oc-
cur" from any form of contact (ingestion, inhalation, skin contact)
with an environmental medium. 33 For each type of exposure, the regu-
lations adopt a "safe harbor" format (i.e., they identify certain warn-
ing methods and messages that by regulation are deemed legally
adequate but that do not preclude other approaches). 34 Unfortu-
nately, as discussed in part IV, the regulations do not sufficiently tailor
the warnings to fit the characteristics of the various audiences that
receive these different types of warnings.
35
B. Enforcement of Proposition 65
Once a chemical is listed and the statutory grace period elapses,
Proposition 65's warning provisions take effect without specific ad-
ministrative standards that specify acceptable levels of exposure. This
contrasts with most environmental statutes, and reverses the usual in-
dustry incentives to delay the setting of administrative standards.
36
Proposition 65 can be enforced by public prosecutors (the California
Attorney General, district attorneys, and certain city attorneys) or by
30. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 26, § 22-12601 (1995).
31. Id. § 22-12601(b).
32. Id. § 22-12601(c).
33. Id. § 22-12601(d). This includes exposure that may foreseeably occur from con-
tact with ambient air, indoor air, drinking water, standing water, running water, soil, vege-
tation, or man-made or natural substances. Id.
34. Id. § 22-12601(a).
35. See Brenda J. Nordenstam & Joseph F. DiMento, Right-to-Know: Implications of
Risk Communication Research for Regulatory Policy, 23 U.C. DAVIs L. REV. 333, 351
(1990) (arguing that effective risk communication requires sensitivity to the traits of widely
different audiences).
36. See David Roe, An Incentive-Conscious Approach to Toxic Chemical Controls, 3
ECON. DEV. Q. 179, 180-81 (1989). Thus, over 250 numeric standards for listed chemicals
(setting acceptable exposure levels) have been adopted under Proposition 65-a pace de-
scribed by the California Environmental Protection Agency as equivalent to "100 years of
progress" by federal standards-and not a single standard has been challenged by regu-
lated entities. See Memorandum from Charles M. Shulock, Assistant Secretary, California
Environmental Protection Agency ('Cal/EPA'), to Proposition 65 Review Panel, Cal/EPA
§ 1.1-2 (Feb. 20, 1992) (on file with author).
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"any person in the public interest. '37 There is, however, no adminis-
trative agency responsible for enforcing the law.
38
In an enforcement action, the defendant bears the burden of
proving that an exposure is exempt from the statute,39 another notable
departure from other environmental laws. There are two main reasons
underlying this provision. The first is that industry is in the best posi-
tion to know about the chemicals it uses and the levels at which they
are harmful.40 The second is that industry, rather than the public,
should bear more of the risk of harm from chemicals about which
there is limited knowledge.
41
Remedies for a Proposition 65 violation are injunctive relief42 and
civil penalties of up to $2,500 per day.43 Twenty-five percent of the
penalties collected go to the plaintiff initiating the enforcement
action."
37. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25249.7(c),(d) (West 1992). A private party act-
ing in the public interest can bring suit under Proposition 65 if (i) 60 days' notice is given to
the defendant, the Attorney General, the district attorney, and any city attorney in whose
jurisdiction the violation is alleged to occur, and (ii) neither the Attorney General nor any
district attorney nor any city attorney or prosecutor has commenced and is diligently pros-
ecuting the alleged violation. Id § 25249.7(d).
38. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25249.7(c) (West 1992). The statute requires the
Governor to designate a lead agency to implement the provisions of the statute. Id.
§ 25249.12. This was initially the HWA and is currently OEHHA. See supra note 27. The
lead agency is responsible for writing implementing regulations but not for actually insur-
ing statutory compliance.
39. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25249.10(c) (West 1992).
40. John Applegate, The Perils of Unreasonable Risk: Information, Regulatory Policy,
and Toxic Substances Contro 91 COLUM. L. REv. 261, 298-99 (1991) ("[I]ndustries that
produce and use chemicals ordinarily are in the best position to provide or obtain toxicity
and exposure data most cheaply and accurately. They have the greatest familiarity with
their products' characteristics and the occasions for exposure to them, and they have the
most opportunities to learn about the chemicals.").
41. Reports estimate that no toxicity data exists on 80% of the chemicals in use today.
Id at 289. See also Ellen K. Silbergeld, The Risks of Comparing Risks, 3 N.Y.U. ENVTL.
L.J. 405, 413-14 (1995) ("Little has changed since the National Research Council (NRC)
noted ten years ago that between seventy-three and eighty-nine percent of chemicals in
commerce have almost no toxicity data upon which even a qualitative identification of
hazard can be made . . ."); CALIFORNIA's EXPERIENCE, supra note 6, at 31 ("[One] tradi-
tion in American politics is that the burden of proof rests with the public .... The recent
performance by regulatory agencies indicates that public institutions simply cannot stay
apace with industry's production of chemicals with unknown effects. Proposition 65 has
provided an indication that the American electorate may no longer be willing to adhere to
[these] time-honored political traditions.").
42. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25249.7(a) (West 1992).
43. Id. § 25249.7(b).
44. Id. § 25192(a).
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II
RATIONALES FOR INFORMATION DISCLOSURE
REQUIREMENTS AND OBJECTIVES OF
PROPOSITION 65's WARNING PROVISION
A. Rationales for Information Disclosure Requirements
Laws utilizing information disclosure requirements-warnings,
informational labeling, worker training and notification, and commu-
nity reporting and disclosure-are based on several important, albeit
diverse, rationales. 45 The most common rationale is that such laws
improve the efficient functioning of the market. Traditional
microeconomic theory assumes consumers have perfect information.
Where such information is lacking and will not be produced by the
market, disclosure laws help insure that the market functions properly
by bridging the information gap. As Professor Mary Lyndon points
out, the market is unlikely to generate data about the toxicity of prod-
ucts on its own. Individual firms will not produce or release toxicity
data about their products because of the negative implications sur-
rounding such information, and third parties are not likely to produce
it because of the "public good" nature of such information.46 Making
information available to the public can lead to improved consumer
decisionmaking, as well as product reformulation, as consumers signal
their preferences for products that are safer or have other desirable
attributes. 47 Comparable benefits can result from providing informa-
tion to workers. Better-informed workers can negotiate for less toxic
working conditions, demand wage premiums for risky jobs, or alter
45. Because of the broad set of underlying rationales, information disclosure laws en-
joy support across the political spectrum. Pease, Chemical Hazards, supra note 25, at 12.
See also JOHN M. MENDELOFF, THE DILEMMA OF Toxic SUBSTANCE REGULATION 209-10
(1988) (Consumer advocates like Ralph Nader favor more information as a right, as well as
a tool, that enables individuals to protest and protect their interests. Conservative econo-
mists prefer such laws over direct government regulation because they rely on the effi-
ciency and power of market forces).
46. Like other public goods such as national defense or clean air, it is difficult to limit
the benefits of this information to individual "purchasers," and as a result, the costs of
producing it cannot be recouped through multiple individual sales. Other disincentives to
the production of toxicity data include the expense and the inexact nature of the informa-
tion produced. Mary L. Lyndon, Information Economics and Chemical Toxicity: Design-
ing Laws to Produce and Use Data, 87 MIcH. L. REV. 1795, 1810-17 (1989). In addition,
the self-correcting function of the market, in which consumers learn about product attrib-
utes and make adjustments through repeated product usage, does not work with toxicity
data, since toxic chemicals have health impacts that are long delayed and difficult to diag-
nose. See Michael B. Mazis et al., A Framework for Evaluating Consumer Information
Regulation, 45 J. MARKETING 11, 12-13 (1981).
47. Mazis et al., supra note 46, at 12. As Lyndon illustrates, the absence of toxicity
data about products means that buyers cannot judge the quality (toxicity) of the products,
thus removing any incentive for manufacturers to differentiate between toxic and nontoxic
products. The result is a higher level of toxicity in products than would otherwise result if
toxicity were disclosed. Lyndon, supra note 46, at 1814.
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their willingness to accept risky jobs.48 Relying on the power of the
market, economists tout information disclosure laws as more efficient
and less constraining than direct regulation, imposing lower costs on
both business and regulators.
49
In addition, information disclosure laws are also premised on an
entitlement rationale, as reflected in the title of recent "right-to-
know" laws.50 The underlying notion is that members of the public
have a "fundamental right to know" what chemicals are "out there"
and the chemicals to which they are being exposed. 51 Information
promotes individual autonomy by providing individuals with knowl-
edge of the risks involved in their choices and allowing them to decide
whether or not to encounter these risks. 52
Information disclosure laws also promote citizen power and ad-
vance democratic decisionmaking.5 3 Professor and regulatory expert
48. W. Kip Viscusi & Charles O'Connor, Hazard Warnings for Workplace Risks: Ef-
fects on Risk Perceptions, Wage Rates, and Turnover, in LEARNING ABOUT RISK 99, 104,
119 (W. Kip Viscusi & Wesley A. Magat eds., 1987); Lyndon, supra note 46, at 1839-31.
49. Because risk preferences vary considerably across the population, banning a prod-
uct imposes costs on consumers who are willing to bear risks that they perceive are out-
weighed by the benefits of a product. James R. Bettman et al., Cognitive Considerations in
Designing Effective Labels for Presenting Risk Information, 5 J. PuB. POL'Y & MARKETING
1, 2 (1986). Informational policies allow users of hazardous products with different suscep-
tibilities to the hazard, different preferences regarding risk, different product needs, and
different usage rates to select the combination of risk, product efficacy, and usage rates
best for each individual. W. Kip Viscusi et al., The Effect of Risk Information on Precau-
tionary Behavior, in LEARNING ABOUT RISK, supra note 48, at 60, 60-61 (1987). The same
benefits accrue to workers who receive risk information. See MENDELOFF, supra note 45,
at 217 (arguing in favor of an information provision that allows workers to choose their
jobs based on their preferences for low-risk or high-risk jobs; direct regulation, by contrast,
constrains worker choice, and, since willingness to take risky jobs is inversely related to
wealth, may impinge most on low-income workers). But see Lars Noah, The Imperative to
Warn: Disentangling the "Right to Know" from the "Need to Know" About Consumer
Product Hazards, 11 YALE J. ON REG. 293, 296-97 (1994) (contending that the costs of
warning programs, in the form of dilution of more serious warnings and consumer over-
reaction to warnings about relatively insignificant risks, are often overlooked by
regulators).
50. See, e.g., Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986 ('EP-
CRA'), 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001-11050 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
51. Applegate, supra note 40, at 295 (describing congressional purpose in adopting
EPCRA); HADDEN, A CITIZEN'S RIGHT TO KNOW, supra note 8, at 15. See also Keith
Schneider, For Communities, Knowledge of Polluters is Power, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 1991,
§ 4, at 5 (quoting Representative Gerry Sikorski, sponsor of EPCRA: "It was a philosophi-
cal leap of faith, kind of a heartfelt belief that people in communities have an absolute,
fundamental right to know what goes into the air their kids breathe, the water they drink,
and the ground they play on.").
52. See Cass R. Sunstein, Informing America: Risk, Disclosure, and the First Amend-
ment, 20 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 653, 655 (1993) ("If people are unaware of the consequences
of their choices, they are, to that extent, less free.").
53. COMMITTEE ON RISK PERCEPTION AND COMMUNICATION, NATIONAL ACADEMY
OF SCIENCES, IMPROVING RISK COMMUNICATION 111 (1989) [hereinafter NATIONAL
ACADEMY OF SCIENCES] (communicating information about risk can increase the desire of
citizens to participate in government decisions); Paulette L. Stenzel, Right-to-Know Provi-
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Cass Sunstein argues that "[w]ithout better information [provided by
such laws], neither deliberation nor democracy is possible. ' 54 Armed
with more information, citizens can make better-informed decisions
and are thus in a better position to bargain with private corporations
and government. 55
Utilitarian rationales also support disclosure requirements. For
example, disclosure requirements provide indirect incentives for in-
dustry to undertake self-regulation and thereby reduce risky activi-
ties.5 6 Congress recently relied on this rationale when it sought to
influence consumer purchase decisions and create an incentive for
manufacturers to shift to safer alternatives by requiring warnings on
products containing ozone-depleting chemicals.5 7 Disclosure require-
ments also help the government determine the need for additional
regulation.58 Other important utilitarian rationales, such as avoiding
accidents and facilitating emergency planning, also support informa-
tion disclosure requirements. 59 Information disclosure laws have in-
herent limitations as well.60 The marketplace model assumes markets
in which there is an elastic demand for products and there are readily
available product substitutes. It is also premised on the existence of
perfectly rational consumers who seek information regarding alterna-
sions of California's Proposition 65: The Naivete of the Delaney Clause Revisited, 15 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 493, 508 (1991) (arguing that the democratic form of government requires
informing citizens about -public policy decisions).
54. Sunstein, supra note 52, at 658; see also HADDEN, A CrTIZEN's RIGrrr TO KNOW,
supra note 8, at 15-17; Green, supra note 8, at 235-36 (arguing that information helps pro-
mote the democratic ideal of a vigorous, informed citizenry).
55. HADDEN, A CITIZEN'S RiGrr TO KNOW, supra note 8, at 15-17 (arguing that
right-to-know laws can alter the balance of power in society); Paulette L. Stenzel, The Need
for a National Risk Assessment Communication Policy, 11 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 381,404-
05 (1987).
56. HADDEN, A CrIZEN's RIGHT TO KNOW, supra note 8, at 15; Hirschorn, supra
note 8, at 337 ("[E]nvironmentalists have found the lever to force industry to give them
and the general public improved quality. That lever is data, and more data, especially
about chemical use, manufacturing operations, products, and environmental claims.").
57. Noah, supra note 49, at 308.
58. See Michael DeCourcy Hinds, As Warning Labels Multiply, Messages Are Often
Ignored, N.Y. TimES, Mar. 5, 1988, at 1 (arguing that consumer leaders press for warnings
to build pressure for safer products and to force government to act).
59. Information alerts consumers and workers to product hazards and helps them
avoid dangers, thereby reducing the number and costs of accidents. Green, supra note 8, at
215. See Victor E. Schwartz & Russell W. Driver, Warnings in the Workplace: The Need for
a Synthesis of Law and Communication Theory, 52 CINCINNATI L. REv. 38, 39 (1982) (ar-
guing that on a risk utility basis, the cost of almost any serious injury justifies the relatively
minor cost of providing warnings). It helps local emergency planners prevent or respond
more safely to chemical accidents. Melinda Haig, Proposition 65's Right-To-Know Provi-
sion: Can it Keep Its Promise to California Voters?, 14 ECOLOGY L.Q. 685, 688-89 (1987).
Information can also make it easier for workers or others to file tort actions or worker
compensation claims by helping them establish that they have been exposed to hazardous
chemicals and the identity of the chemicals. Applegate, supra note 40, at 295-96.
60. See generally HADDEN, supra note 7, at 211-27.
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tives when making decisions, make trade-offs that allow them to com-
pute utilities for every alternative, and select the alternatives that
maximize utility.61 However, these conditions are often not satisfied. 62
Consumers may lack the time or interest to seek out information.
63
Many may have difficulty understanding certain information, espe-
cially information about risks.64 In particular, less educated and lim-
ited-English speaking individuals are less likely to be able to read,
understand, and use warning information. 65 Even when individuals
read and comprehend warnings, they often do not change their behav-
ior in response to the information they receive.66 Workers, for in-
stance, may disregard the seriousness of the risks to which they are
61. James. R. Bettman et al., Consumer Decision Making, in HANDBOOK OF CON-
SUMER BEHAVIOR 50, 53 (Thomas S. Robertson & Harold H. Kassarjian eds., 1991).
62. See HADDEN, supra note 7, at 211-227 (criticizing assumptions underlying model
of consumer as rational actor).
63. See Nordenstam & DiMento, supra note 35, at 353 (stating that in general, Ameri-
can consumers are not information-seekers: only ten to twenty percent of Americans seek
information, and these people generally have high incomes, high media use, and high confi-
dence in scientific test data); see also Bettman et al., supra note 61, at 71 (arguing that
persons of lower socioeconomic status acquire less information than persons of higher so-
cioeconomic status in making consumer choices); The Unpredictable (and Only Sometimes
Green) Green Consumer, GREEN MARKETALERT, Mar. 1, 1994, available in WESTLAW,
GRMRKTAL database (surveys suggest that "green consumers" are predominantly fe-
male, affluent, and well-educated).
64. See infra part III.B.2.b.ii. See also Bettman et al., supra note 61, at 53-57 (discuss-
ing the limitations on consumers' ability to process information); Wesley A. Magat et al.,
Consumer Processing of Hazard Warning Information, 1 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 201,229-
31 (1988) (concluding that there is an upper bound on individuals' abilities to process risk
information, which is often exceeded by chemical warning labels).
65. Hadden, Regulating Product Risks, supra note 8, at 101 (1991). See 2 PLANNING,
POLICY AND EVALUATION, U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ENVIRONMEN-
TAL Eourry: REDUCING RISK FOR ALL COMMUNmES 47 (1992) [hereinafter ENVIRON-
MENTAL EQurY] (persons with low literacy skills or whose first language is not English
may have trouble understanding warning labels; high rates of illiteracy among minorities
and low-income groups compounds communication problems with these groups); NA-
TIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, supra note 53, at 69 (information made available to the
public is typically utilized more readily by those with high socioeconomic status who have a
higher level of education, enabling them to understand technical data more easily). The
elderly also may not be able to benefit from warning information because of limited optical
abilities. Hadden, Regulating Product Risks, supra note 8, at 100; BLAIR M. BREWSTER ET
AL., WHITE PAPER ON SAFETY SIGN COMPONENTS 12 (1995) (one in six Americans age 45
or older report some sort of vision impairment).
66. See Vincent T. Covello et al., Risk Communication: A Review of the Literature, 3
RISK ABSTRACTS 171, 172-75 (1986) (various problems complicate the task of changing
behavior, including lack of interest and motivation, a reluctance to make necessary trade-
offs, or excessive fear and anxiety); David W. Stewart & Ingrid M. Martin, Intended and
Unintended Consequences of Warning Messages: A Review and Synthesis of Empirical Re-
search, 13 J. PuB. POL'Y & MARKETING 1, 10 (1994) (consumers may not understand a
warning or find it credible, or may choose not to act on a warning after evaluating the costs
and benefits of complying, particularly if consequences of not complying are more distant
in time, or if they believe themselves more careful or more skilled than the average
consumer).
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exposed when they perceive the risks as involuntary or out of their
control.
67
Furthermore, some workers may be powerless to demand or ef-
fect change, especially in the absence of a unionized workforce.
68
Workers of color and low-wage workers are more likely than the rest
of the population to work in jobs with higher exposure to toxic chemi-
cals.69 They are the most economically vulnerable, largely because
they perceive great risks in complaining to their employers.
70 This is
particularly true for recent immigrant workers who are frequently un-
organized, face substantial language and cultural barriers, and fear
employer retaliation not only in terms of potentially losing a job but
also their immigration status.
71
Moreover, persons exposed to chemicals in the environment have
no traditional "market" in which they can express their preferences.
72
Additionally, conveying information about environmental exposures
is much more difficult because there is no single point of purchase, as
with consumer products, or even a single point of exposure, as in the
workplace.
67. Nordenstam & DiMento, supra note 35, at 355-56.
68. See THOMAS 0. MCGARITY & SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO, WORKERS AT RISK 208
(1993). (stating that workers lack sufficient power to make real choices about acceptability
of workplace risks); HADDEN, supra note 7, at 99 (choices of workers may be limited by
high cost of alternate employment, either because there are no jobs or because of high
penalties incurred for leaving a job). See also JAMES C. ROBINSON, TOIL AND Toxics:
WORKPLACE STRUGGLES AND POLITICAL STRATEGIES FOR OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH 141
(1991) (reporting that the vast majority of private sector workers are employees-at-will and
enjoy limited protections for asserting their rights).
69. George Friedman-Jimdnez, Achieving Environmental Justice: The Role of Occupa-
tional Health, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 604, 606-07 (1994). Among other findings, Fried-
man-Jim6nez cites two studies of workers in California, one showing that 46% of adults
with blood lead levels above 60 micrograms per deciliter (a toxic level requiring immediate
removal from worker) were Hispanic; the other showing that Hispanic and black workers
had higher risks of occupational disease and injury than whites. Id. at 611. See also
Michael Fisher, Environmental Racism Claims Brought Under Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act, 25 ENv-rL. L. 285,297-98 (1995) (citing studies showing that overwhelming majority of
migrant farmworkers are ethnic minorities, and that these workers suffer highest incidence
of toxic poisoning of any occupational group).
70. Friedman-Jim6nez, supra note 69, at 615-16.
71. See Flora Chu, Asian Workers at Risk, RACE, POVERTY & ENV'T, Spring 1992, at
10, 12; Young-Im Yoo, Asian Immigrant Women Advocates, RACE, POVERTY & ENV'T,
Spring 1992, at 11; Friedman-Jim6nez, supra note 69, at 615-16; Equal Rights Advocates &
The Coalition for Immigrant and Refugee Rights and Services, How Employer Sanctions
Undermine the Enforcement of Federal Labor Laws: A Study 4 (1991) (copy on file with
author) (stating that immigrant workers are afraid to complain about workplace health and
safety violations due to fear of employer retaliation).
72. Community residents may theoretically sell their homes and leave the area, but
this is not a realistic option for most people, and in any case, it does not exert economic
pressure on the entity responsible for the exposures. One commentator argues that
"[Kinowledge about hazardous substances in the community seldom brings with it the abil-
ity to do anything about them . . . [because] citizens [are] generally in a much poorer
position to reduce risk." Applegate, supra note 40, at 296-97.
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Despite these limitations, it is important to note that only a small
number of motivated persons-e.g., attentive, information-seeking
consumers, unions, or environmental organizations-actually needs to
use information to accomplish some of the desired benefits of infor-
mation disclosure laws. A small group's energetic attention to warn-
ings or other information can force product reformulation, safer
workplace conditions, or reductions in community exposures that ben-
efit large numbers of consumers, workers, or other individuals. 73
B. Objectives of Proposition 65's Warning Requirement
Consistent with the rationales underlying information disclosure
statutes, Proposition 65 has two broadly expressed purposes: 1) to in-
form the public about exposures to toxic substances, and 2) to reduce
exposures to toxic substances.74 As to the former, the statute is
clearly intended to promote informed individual choice and decision-
making. As explained by the HWA, the intent of voters was to "re-
ceive warnings which will enable them to make informed choices. ' 75
This is consistent with the Act's goals of correcting market imperfec-
tions, promoting personal autonomy, and satisfying the public's "right
to know," all of which may have motivated voters. The language of
entitlement, however, figures most prominently in the statutory
materials. The ballot argument 76 reads:
Proposition 65 also tells businesses: Don't expose us to any [listed]
chemicals without first giving us a clear warning. We each have a right
to know, and to make our own choices about being exposed to these
chemicals. 77
73. See Mazis et al., supra note 46, at 12 (stating that a minority of consumers voting
their preferences can lead producers to modify their products, benefitting all consumers);
Lyndon, supra note 46, at 1831-32 (arguing that it is not necessary for all consumers to
actively use information to benefit; energetic "comparison shoppers" can have significant
effects for all consumers).
74. See Nordenstam & DiMento, supra note 35, at 341 (stating that proponents of
Proposition 65 identified need for greater protection from, and more information about,
the growing number of hazards present in their environment); Kara Christenson, Interpret-
ing the Purposes of Initiatives: Proposition 65, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 1031, 1053 (1989) (arguing
that the fundamental purpose of Proposition 65 is to provide protection and information to
the public regarding carcinogens and reproductive toxicants).
75. California Health and Welfare Agency, Final Statement of Reasons, 22 Cal. Code
of Regs. Div. 2, at 3-4 (1988) (official filing accompanying regulatory amendment, current
version at 26 CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 26, § 22-12601 (1993)) [hereinafter Final Statement];
"The apparent purpose of any warning under the Act is to permit the persons exposed to
make choices about the exposure." Id. at 43.
76. California courts interpreting voter initiatives rely on ballot arguments as the pri-
mary source of voter intent. AFL-CIO v. Deukmejian, 260 Cal. Rptr. 479, 484 (Ct. App.
1989). For a general discussion about interpreting California initiatives, see Christenson,
supra note 74, at 1040-51.
77. BALLOT PAMPHLET, supra note 6, at 54.
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The statutory preamble likewise declares the people's right "[t]o be
informed about exposures to chemicals that cause cancer, birth de-
fects or other reproductive harm. 78 This rationale has broad, power-
ful appeal. It was marshalled, for example, by former EPA
Administrator William Reilly in defending Proposition 65 against
strenuous efforts by the food industry to preempt the statute:
The law simply warns people about their exposure to carcinogenic or
reproductively toxic chemicals at levels exceeding 'no significant risk.'
It is hard to argue with providing information to the public.
79
Proposition 65 was also designed to reduce exposure to toxic
chemicals. The statutory preamble describes public concern with ex-
posure to these chemicals and frustration at the ineffectiveness of ex-
isting regulatory programs. Specifically, it notes that "[t]he people of
California find that hazardous chemicals pose a serious potential
threat to their health and well-being [and] that state government
agencies have failed to provide them with adequate protection."80
This concern is further reflected in the supporting ballot argument,
which states:
[O]ur present toxics laws aren't tough enough. Despite them, pol-
luters contaminate our drinking water and expose us to extremely
toxic chemicals without our knowing it. The health of innocent people
is jeopardized.
81
Thus, beyond simply informing people, Proposition 65 was intended
to provide a "compelling incentive" for industry to remove nonessen-
tial carcinogens and reproductive toxins from its products and
processes.82 This strategy, as noted approvingly by former EPA Ad-
ministrator Reilly, "uses market incentives rather than command and
78. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25249.5 (West 1992) (historical note) (emphasis
added); see also Final Statement, supra note 75, at 22 (analogizing purpose of warning
requirement to purpose of informed consent doctrine).
79. Letter from William K. Reilly, Administrator, U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency, to Louis W. Sullivan, Secretary of Department of Health and Human Services 1
(undated letter; on file with author).
80. Preamble to Initiative Measure, Safe Drinking Water Act and Toxic Enforcement
Act of 1986 § 1, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25249.5 (West 1992 & Supp. 1995) (his-
torical note).
81. BALLOT PAMPHLET, supra note 6, at 54.
82. See Roberts, supra note 6, at 307 (quoting David Roe, one of the statute's princi-
pal authors, as stating that most companies would prefer to find a new safer chemical
rather than provide a warning if given the choice). See also Stenzel, supra note 53, at 498
(reporting that the drafters believed that toxics reduction would result from two factors:
market pressure from consumers would cause manufacturers to switch to nontoxic prod-
ucts, and manufacturers would withdraw their products due to public pressure and the
desire to avoid tort suits); Kristen Stevens, Regulating Toxics at the State Level: Proposition
65's Warning Requirement, 9 STAN. ENvrL. L.J. 84, 88-89 (1990) (arguing that the warning
requirement was intended to help remove dangerous toxics from the marketplace through
consumer choice, publicity, and threat of penalties).
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control mechanisms to reduce consumers' exposure to toxic chemicals
(e.g., food importers have switched away from lead-soldered cans)."
'83
III
EVALUATING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF PROPOSITION 65
WARNINGS
A. Introduction
Given Proposition 65's objectives, two criteria should be used to
evaluate how well the warning requirement has effectuated statutory
purposes. First, it is necessary to analyze whether warnings required
by the statute effectively communicate information about toxic chemi-
cal exposure-in particular, whether the warnings provide individuals
with sufficient information to facilitate meaningful choice, promote
better-informed decisionmaking, and satisfy the entitlement goals of
the statute.84 This requires examining how noticeable, comprehensi-
ble, and accurate the warnings are, questions particularly informed by
the cognitive psychology and risk communication disciplines.
Second, evaluation of Proposition 65's effectiveness requires an
analysis of whether warnings, or the warning requirement, have
achieved the statute's objective of reducing exposures to toxic chemi-
cals. This question requires a study of the empirical evidence regard-
ing the warning requirement's impact on business products and
processes.
83. Letter from William K. Reilly to Louis Sullivan, supra note 79, at 1. Reilly noted
that "[t]his is consistent with [President Bush's] call for more economically-oriented regu-
latory programs." Id. (The reference to lead-soldered cans being eliminated is discussed
infra at notes 213 and 214). Not all observers think that promoting toxics reductions is an
appropriate goal for a warning statute such as Proposition 65. See, e.g., Viscusi, supra note
7, at 134-35 (arguing that the objective of warnings should be to allow individuals to make
informed choices, not necessarily to prompt drastic reductions in the use of products, and
that if the goal of society is to constrain severely or eliminate product use, a product ban,
rather than a warning, is the appropriate measure); Noah, supra note 49, at 296-97 (arguing
that warning statutes should not be used to foster product reformulation, but reserved for
providing precautionary information about avoiding acute hazards, and that either public
education campaigns or direct regulation are more appropriate for dealing with chronic
health risks posed by consumer products).
84. This is distinct from whether the warning has changed behavior. See NATIONAL
ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, supra note 53, at 80 ("Although risk messages are sometimes
judged against a criterion of behavior change, this is not an appropriate test of whether an
individual has made an informed choice. It is possible for an individual, fully informed of
the risks, to choose to engage in hazardous behaviors such as smoking, skydiving, or leav-
ing seat belts unbuckled.").
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B. Do Proposition 65 Warnings Satisfy the Informational Objectives
of the Statute?
1. Introduction
Borrowing generally from the framework used by cognitive psy-
chologists, 85 this Part evaluates how effectively Proposition 65 warn-
ings communicate information to the public. The analysis begins by
determining whether individuals actually notice the warnings. For this
to occur, individuals must be "exposed" to warnings (i.e., come into
contact with them) in the first place;s6 the warnings must then attract
their attention.87 The next question is whether the warnings will be
read. Even when individuals "see" warnings they may not attend to
them. Consumer responses often depend upon the physical appear-
ance of the warnings and how interesting or personally relevant the
contents appear. Finally, to be effective, warnings must communicate
adequate and accurate information in a manner that is readily under-
standable.8s With respect to this last measuring stick, two questions
are of particular import. First, do the warnings contain sufficient in-
formation for individuals to understand that they are actually being
exposed to chemicals that cause cancer or reproductive harm-the un-
derlying message of the statute? Second, will individuals understand
the level of risk to which they are being exposed?
The remainder of this Subpart evaluates warnings provided for
consumer products, workplace exposures, and environmental expo-
sures. Each section analyzes the specific regulations applicable to
each type of exposure, examines the warnings that businesses have
actually provided to the public, and assesses how effectively the warn-
ings communicate information to the public based on the above crite-
ria. Subpart C evaluates the extent to which Proposition 65's warning
provision has reduced exposures to hazardous substances. Last, Part
85. See generally Stewart & Martin, supra note 66, at 4 (recommending that effects of
warnings should be evaluated at several stages in communications process); Mazis et al.,
supra note 46, at 14 (describing similar framework for evaluating effectiveness of commu-
nications); Michael Wogalter, Factors Influencing the Effectiveness of Warnings, 1994
PROC. OF PUB. GRAPHICS, UNIV. OF UTRECHT, NETHERLANDS 2,4-5 (recommending simi-
lar model for evaluating warnings).
86. Nordenstam & DiMento, supra note 35, at 359-60.
87. See Stewart & Martin, supra note 66, at 4.
88. Warnings are also often evaluated based on whether they change consumer be-
havior in the desired direction. See Stewart & Martin, supra note 66, at 2-4 (warnings have
multiple definitions, multiple purposes, and multiple criteria for effectiveness; some are
designed to merely inform, while others are judged by whether they alter behavior). Prop-
osition 65, however, appears to have been primarily designed to inform consumers rather
than to trigger specific behavioral responses.
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D discusses whether Proposition 65 has led to overwarning, i.e., the
provision of unnecessary warnings. 89
2. Consumer Product Warnings
a. Presentation of Warnings
The HWA implementing regulations identify four types of "safe
harbor" warning methods90 for consumer product exposures. The first
two are product labeling and shelf signs.91 A third method resulted
from a quasi-negotiated rulemaking between alcohol industry repre-
sentatives and the HWA, and calls for a very detailed protocol for
shelf, table, and wall signs for alcoholic beverages sold in retail stores
or at bars and restaurants.92
The last method is a toll-free information service and represents
the most far-reaching attempt to enfeeble the warning provision.93 It
stemmed from a proposal by the Grocery Manufacturers of America
(GMA) to allow warnings to be given through an 800-number tele-
phone system, which consumers would theoretically call if they wished
to discover whether a particular product carried a Proposition 65
warning. The regulations endorsed the concept of a toll-free informa-
tion service, so long as the system provided "clear and reasonable
warnings" (i.e., satisfied the basic statutory mandate), under the "safe
harbor" regulations. 94 GMA and its members initiated an 800 "warn-
ing" system operated by the nonprofit Ingredient Communication
89. This analysis is illustrative rather than exhaustive, given the absence of compre-
hensive empirical data about what warnings have been provided. Nonetheless, the author
has been able to gather sufficiently representative data from a number of sources to draw
general conclusions. This includes extensive information provided by OEHHA, the Cali-
fornia Attorney General's Office, and the California Occupational Safety and Health Ad-
ministration ("Cal/OSHA"); hundreds of Proposition 65 newspaper warnings published
over the past seven years; and the results of a 1992 survey of businesses about Proposition
65 conducted by Cal/EPA.
90. See infra part III.B.2.b for discussion of safe harbor warning methods.
91. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 26, § 22-12601(b)(1)(A),(B) (1995). The warnings must be
presented "with such conspicuousness... as to render [them] likely to be read and under-
stood by an ordinary individual under customary conditions of purchase or use." Id. § 22-
12601(b)(3).
92. Id. § 22-12601(b)(1)(D). Unlike other consumer product warning methods, in
which ultimate responsibility for providing warnings to consumers is shared by manufac-
turers, distributors, and retailers, this provision specifically provides that liability for failure
to provide warnings rests with the manufacturers or distributors, absent affirmative inter-
ference by a retailer with a manufacturer's efforts to post and maintain such signs. Id. § 22-
12601(b)(2).
93. Id. § 22-12601(b)(1)(C). The regulation provides for "[a] system of signs, public
advertising identifying the system, and toll-free information services, or any other system,
that provides clear and reasonable warnings." Id.
94. See id. In contrast, compliance with the other consumer product warning meth-
ods-product labels, shelf signs, or signs for alcoholic beverages-is by itself deemed to be
clear and reasonable and sufficient to satisfy the statute. Cf. id. § 12601(b)(1)(A),(B),(D).
1996] THE WARNING GAME
Council (ICC) and publicized by in-store grocery signs and newspaper
advertisements. The system allowed callers to hear a consumer prod-
uct warning provided they precisely identified the product for which
they sought a warning. The store signs and advertisements completely
failed to alert consumers as to which products were subject to a warn-
ing. Several dozen companies included their products in the system,
guaranteeing invisibility for their consumer product warnings. This
was demonstrated by the system's first year of operation, in which
fewer than 500 warning messages to consumers were delivered in a
state with 10-15 million households.95 The ICC's system was subse-
quently invalidated on the ground that it merely invited consumer in-
quiries instead of providing a warning that consumers were likely to
see.
96
Since then, most consumer product warnings have been located
on product labels.97 (One exception is warnings for alcoholic bever-
ages.) 98 Although the regulations state that warnings must be
presented with "such conspicuousness as to render them likely to be
read and understood by an ordinary individual under customary con-
ditions of purchase or use,"99 in practice this general requirement has
imposed few limitations on businesses and has done little to insure
that warnings are noticed. 100 Many Proposition 65 warnings are inade-
95. Ingredient Communication Council, Inc. v. Lungren, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 216, 225 (Ct.
App. 1992).
96. See id. at 224. Although the regulation remains in place, it appears highly unlikely
that another 800-number system will be attempted.
97. Telephone Interview with Craig Thompson, Supervising Deputy Attorney Gen-
eral, California Attorney General's Office (Aug. 25, 1995); Telephone Interview with Cath-
.erine Caraway, Senior Hazardous Material Specialist, OEHHA (Sept. 7, 1995). The most
notable consumer products bearing Proposition 65 warnings are cigars, pipe tobacco, and
roll-your-own tobacco products. These products are exempt from federal cigarette labeling
requirements. The warnings resulted from an enforcement action filed soon after Proposi-
tion 65 became effective. Richard Paddock, Warnings to Come Soon on Cigars, Pipe To-
bacco, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 19, 1988, at A25.
98. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 26 § 22-12601(b)(I)(D) (1995).
99. Id., § 22-12601(b)(3). There are, however, detailed regulatory criteria for alco-
holic beverage warnings.
The disjunctive nature of this requirement-that warnings be read prior to purchase
or use-is unfortunate, because it potentially allows warnings that do nothing to inform
consumers about exposures prior to purchase, thus frustrating their ability to make in-
formed choices. See Nordenstam & DiMento, supra note 35, at 360 ("Research indicates
that once a consumer purchases a product, the consumer psychologically becomes commit-
ted to the purchase, and risk information may not change a decision on a product's use.
This finding provides additional support for the need to provide adequate risk information
at the point of purchase.").
100. In this respect, Proposition 65 is similar to many other federal warning programs,
which do not specify the placement, format or content of warnings. See Viscusi, supra
note 7, at 154 (providing examples of other such programs). An exception is warnings for
pharmaceutical products required by FDA. See id. at 149-54. For a criticism of many ex-
isting warning labels, see Hadden, Regulating Product Risks, supra note 8, at 97-100.
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quately designed to attract attention.101 Like most other "warning en-
vironments," the consumer product marketplace is cluttered.
Consequently, experts have found that for product warnings to be
seen, they must possess characteristics that make them stand out from
their background. 10 2
Research shows that numerous design features can make warn-
ings more conspicuous, such as using a high color contrast relative to
the background; using large, legible, bold-face characters; placing
warnings prominently; using symbols or icons; and using signal
words. 10 3 However, except for employing the signal word "WARN-
ING," the great majority of Proposition 65 warnings have none of
these characteristics. The very few warnings that use symbols or other
icons have resulted from Proposition 65 enforcement actions. 1
°4
Proposition 65 warnings have appeared on the back of product
labels,105 on the underside of product cans, 0 6 or on the inside of lids
covering product cans and boxes. 0 7 Some have been in small print
and dull type, sometimes squeezed onto labels already crowded with
information. 08 The size and placement of warnings have rarely been
challenged. One notable exception is a case in which a jury found that
warnings in small type on the back of cans of paint strippers contain-
ing methylene chloride were not clear and reasonable. 10 9 In that case,
101. Telephone Interview with Thompson, supra note 97.
102. See HADDEN, supra note 7, at 219 ("Shoppers in grocery stores are exposed to
thousands of labeled products in the course of a half-hour trip .... The print and broadcast
media are filled with advertisements about the same products. In an environment so rich
in information that is often unhelpful and distracting, warning labels must be able to grab
and hold attention in order to fulfill their purpose."); see also Wogalter, supra note 85, at
5.
103. Stewart & Martin, supra note 66, at 8; Wogalter, supra note 85, at 5; Don Olden-
burg, Words of Warning, WASH. Posr, Mar. 17, 1992, at B5; Hadden, Regulating Product
Risks, supra note 8, at 98. See also Eddie M. Clark & Timothy C. Brock, Warning Label
Location, Advertising, and Cognitive Responding, in A1-I-rrrloN, ATrrrUDE AND AFFEcr
IN RESPONSE TO ADVERTISING 287, 296 (Eddie M. Clark et al. eds., 1994) (discussing ex-
periments to assess effect of variations in the format of warnings).
104. Telephone Interview with Caraway, supra note 97. For instance, the manufactur-
ers of ceramic tableware containing lead are required by a consent judgment to provide
warnings by posting yellow triangles on or near their products (along with in-store warn-
ings). See Prop. 65 Litigation, supra note 15, at 15. As a result of another settlement,
warnings posted in dentists' offices for some dental fillings containing mercury include a
yellow triangle. Jane Kay, Dentists To Post Warnings on Mercury, S.F. EXAMINER, Dec. 14,
1993, at Al. (There is currently no widely accepted symbol for conveying cancer or repro-
ductive toxicity risks. See infra notes 112-14 and accompanying text.)
105. See Warning for Zynolyet Speed-E-Namel.
106. See Warning for Reefer Galler's "No-Moth" mothballs.
107. See Warnings for Benjamin Sheridan bullet cartridges; Winchester bullet
cartridges.
108. See Warning Label for SecondWind Shoe Goo.
109. Environmental Defense Fund v. Parks Corp., No. 941281 (S.F. Super. Ct. filed
Mar. 11, 1992), summarized in Prop. 65 Litigation, supra note 15, at 27-28. The plaintiffs'
expert in that case testified that the warnings were inconspicuous because they were placed
[Vol. 23:303
THE WARNING GAME
jurors reported being struck by the fact that the defense's own expert
witness, when presented with a huge poster-sized blowup of the de-
fendant's paint stripper label, could not locate the warning without
help from defendant's lawyer.110 The failure of companies to place
warnings in more conspicuous locations greatly reduces the number of
people who see them, since most consumers are not likely to actively
seek information about products."'
b. Content of Warnings
i. Communication of Exposure Information
Proposition 65 does not require any specific warning language,
but the regulations do set forth "safe harbor" warning messages,
which have been used on virtually all consumer product warnings.
The basic safe harbor message for a consumer product warning states:
"WARNING: This product contains a chemical known to the State of
California to cause cancer [birth defects or other reproductive
harm]. 11 2 The warning message does not use symbols, despite a great
deal of evidence that in addition to increasing the attractiveness of a
warning, symbols facilitate the ability of consumers to process warning
information." 3 Symbols are especially desirable given the substantial
on the back of the can, printed in small type, and surrounded with other information. Todd
Woody, Prop 65 Faces Ist Jury Tes4 RECORDER, Feb. 24, 1994, at 1. The expert also testi-
fied that the warning message provided by the defendant, which referred to the carcinoge-
nicity of methylene chloride in laboratory animals, implied a lower risk to humans. Id.
110. Dennis Pfaff, Company Fined $210K for Prop. 65 Breach, L.A. DAILY J., Mar. 8,
1994, at 3. In another case, warnings for brass kitchen faucets were provided on warranties
or on other product instructions stuffed inside the boxes in which faucets are packaged.
Despite hearing evidence that close to fifty percent of consumers do not install their own
faucets, and thus likely never see these warnings, a superior court judge refused to require
the manufacturers to provide more noticeable forms of warning, such as a hang tag from
the faucet, or a sticker embossed on the faucet. See People v. American Standard, No.
948017 (S.F. Super. Ct. filed Dec. 15, 1992); NRDC v. Price Pfister, No. 948024 (S.F. Super.
Ct. filed Dec. 15, 1992).
111. See Nordenstam & DiMento, supra note 35, at 353-54 ("A risk communication
program which requires active information seeking by the consumer will reach only a small
minority of the intended audience.").
112. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 26, § 22-12601(b)(4)(A)-(B) (1995). For fresh fruits, nuts,
and vegetables, the warning instead reads: "This product may contain a chemical known to
the State of California to cause cancer, or birth defects or other reproductive harm." Id.
§ 22-12601(b)(4)(D) (emphasis added).
A separate "safe harbor" message for alcoholic beverages also exists: "WARNING:
Drinking Distilled Spirits, Beer, Coolers, Wine and Other Alcoholic Beverages May In-
crease Cancer Risk, and, During Pregnancy, Can Cause Birth Defects." Id. § 22-
12601(b)(4)(E).
113. Bettman, supra note 49, at 14. Bettman and his colleagues argue that symbols
should be used whenever possible to depict the type and degree of hazard posed by a
product. Id.; see also Hadden, Regulating Product Risks, supra note 8, at 98 (graphical
presentation is one method of improving understanding of warning messages). But see
Stewart & Martin, supra note 66, at 8-9 (suggesting that because symbols can take many
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portion of the population that cannot read, is functionally illiterate, or
cannot read English. 1 4
The safe harbor warning statement also does not inform individu-
als that use of the product will expose them to a listed chemical.
Rather, it simply contains the less informative message that the prod-
uct contains a listed chemical. This inadequacy directly hinders com-
munication of the statute's central message. It also makes the warning
less personally relevant to recipients and more likely to be over-
looked, since, not surprisingly, consumers are more likely to attend to
warnings that they find personally relevant." 5
In adopting this language, HWA took the position that communi-
cating the presence of a listed chemical is normally sufficient to imply
the certainty of potential exposure.'1 6 This presumption is clearly
flawed for consumer products where the circumstances of exposure
are not obvious. It seems improbable, for example, that consumers
warned that a brass kitchen faucet contains lead will understand that
they actually ingest lead when they drink from the faucet. Moreover,
consumers are less likely to read warnings if they believe a product is
not hazardous." 7 Since consumers regard most products in common
usage as safe,118 they are not likely to pay close attention to a warning,
like the safe harbor message, that does not challenge these existing
assumptions.
Notably, state regulators have subsequently acknowledged that
the safe harbor language "lacks the information that a recipient ex-
pects to receive," and leaves recipients unsure about "whether there is
an exposure, the identity of the chemical, and the source of the expo-
sure."" 9 The safe harbor language, however, has not been changed.
forms and may not always have well understood meanings, general conclusions about the
effects of symbols are probably inappropriate).
114. A 1992 national assessment found that 21% of U.S. adults, age 16 and over,
lacked the ability to understand and use printed textual material in English, as tested by
the ability to locate a single item of information within a short text. IRWIN S. KIRSH, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, ADULT LITERACY IN AMERICA 16-17, 73-75 (1993), re-
printed in THOMAS D. SNYDER & CHARLENE M. HOFFMAN, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCA-
TION, DIGEST OF EDUCATIONAL STATISTICS 392, 408 (1994).
115. Stewart & Martin, supra note 66, at 5; see also NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES,
supra note 53, at 165-66 (emphasizing the importance of making risk information person-
ally relevant to recipients).
116. See Final Statement, supra note 75, at 24-25.
117. Wogalter et al., Consumer Product Warnings: The Role of Hazard Perception, 22
J. SAFETY RES. 71, 72-75 (1991); Hadden, Regulating Product Risks, supra note 8, at 98
("[I1n the world of labeling, familiarity with a product does appear to breed contempt of
risk, and contempt of the need to read and use warnings and instructions.").
118. See Ingredient Communication Council, Inc. v. Lungren, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 216, 225
(Ct. App. 1992) (in the absence of Proposition 65 warnings, most consumers assume that
products they purchase are safe).
119. California Health and Welfare Agency, Initial Statement of Reasons, Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking, Amendments to Section 12601, at 3 (1991) [hereinafter Initial
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Proposition 65 warnings also fail to identify the specific chemicals
causing an exposure. The HWA reasoned that this would make warn-
ings too congested and cumbersome to read.120 This logic seems
faulty. While many chemical names mean little to most of the public,
identifying the specific names of harmful chemicals promotes more
fully informed disclosure and decisionmaking. 121 Listing chemical
names enables interested individuals to determine the relevant health
effects of exposures on their own, and facilitates their ability to seek
treatment for injuries or compensation through the tort system. 122
The warnings also fail to convey other useful information for in-
formed decisionmaking, such as the means of exposure (inhalation,
ingestion, or absorption), or information about steps that can be taken
to reduce exposures. The statutory language and accompanying ballot
arguments of Proposition 65 indicate that stimulating precautionary
behavior by consumers is not a primary objective of the statute. Pro-
viding some precautionary information in warnings, however, would
be beneficial to consumers and would certainly be consistent with its
broad statutory purposes.
123
ii. Communication of Risk Information
A Proposition 65 warning essentially warns that there is some
level of risk associated with a product. However, the safe harbor
warning message does not provide the consumer with any basis for
evaluating the level or nature of the risk posed by individual expo-
sures.124 The consumer knows only that the product contains a chemi-
cal known to cause cancer or reproductive toxicity. A warning that
more accurately explains that the product exposes the consumer to a
Statement]. This statement came in connection with OEHHA's unsuccessful efforts to
amend the warning regulations, discussed infra part IV.A.
120. Final Statement, supra note 75, at 4, 25.
121. Where there are multiple chemicals in a product causing exposures above the
warning level, requiring identification of only the 2 or 3 causing the highest exposures
would prevent the warnings from becoming cluttered with information. This suggestion
was made by OEHHA as part of its unsuccessful reform proposals. See infra part IV.A.
122. Moreover, the failure to require inclusion of chemical names has contributed to
the problem of overwarning; businesses that warn solely as a hedge against liability can
more easily hide behind a generic warning if they do not have to disclose the name of the
chemical(s) responsible for the supposed exposure. See infra notes 143-46 and accompany-
ing text.
123. For example, faucet warnings could state that lead exposures can be dramatically
reduced if users run their water for 30 to 60 seconds before use. Likewise, after a settle-
ment with the Attorney General's Office, wine manufacturers instructed users that wiping
the lip of a wine bottle with a towel before pouring the wine reduces lead exposures. Prop
65 Litigation, supra note 15, at 13.
124. See Stenzel, supra note 53, at 515; W. Kip Viscusi, Predicting the Effects of Food
Cancer Risk Warnings on Consumers, 43 FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 283, 296 (1988).
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specific chemical would still fail to describe the level of risk posed by
the exposure.
The extensive literature in this area confirms that communicating
information about risks to the public effectively is not an easy task.
125
Most individuals have difficulty making sense of risk information,
which is often presented in complex scientific terms.126 People also
tend to distort risks by relying on heuristics127 or by allowing common
psychological factors and other personal experiences to affect their
risk perceptions. 28
Nonetheless, Proposition 65's "one-size-fits-all" safe harbor
message, which fails to provide the public with any guidance in evalu-
ating the level of risk (or distinguishing among products with different
risk levels), further decreases the probability that consumers will accu-
rately judge the risks involved.' 29 This is particularly true given that
certain qualitative dimensions of Proposition 65 risks and heuristics
are likely to lead to exaggerated risk perceptions, while others may
cause an underestimation of the risks involved.
For example, risks of cancer or reproductive harm have certain
characteristics that are generally known to cause people to increase
125. Bettman et al., supra note 49, at 12-13. The literature describing how risk infor-
mation is communicated and how it is perceived by the public is considerable. See gener-
ally NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, supra note 53; Paul Slovic, Perception of Risk, 236
SCIENCE 280 (1987); Covello et al., supra note 66; JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY:
HEURISTICS AND BIASES (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982) [hereinafter JUDGMENT
UNDER UNCERTAINTY]; see Nordenstam & DiMento, supra note 35 (reviewing variety of
social science research about risk communication relevant to right-to-know laws, including
Proposition 65). The divergence between public perceptions of risk and those of scientific
experts has been the source of much recent commentary. See Clayton Gillette & James
Krier, Risk, Courts, and Agencies, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1027, 1071-85 (1990); STEPHEN
BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK REGULATION
(1993).
126. See HADDEN, supra note 7, at 215 ("The evidence that people do not understand
risk information very well is nothing less than overwhelming.").
127. Heuristics are rules of thumb or strategies for systematically simplifying the search
through available information about a problem; they function by disregarding some of the
information. Bettman et al., supra note 49, at 9-10. Although heuristics are a basic princi-
ple of human information processing, they can distort risk perceptions. Id. at 10. For a
discussion of heuristics that people use to evaluate risk, see Amos Tversky & Daniel
Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, in JUDGMENT UNDER UN-
CERTAINTY, supra note 125, at 3.
128. The public evaluates risk based on a range of qualitative factors other than the
probability of a hazard occurring. See Slovic, supra note 125, at 282-83; NATIONAL ACAD-
EMY OF SCIENCES, supra note 53, at 51-52; Mary L. Lyndonj Risk Assessment, Risk Com-
munication and Legitimacy: An Introduction to the Symposium, 14 COLUM. J. ENVrL. L.
289, 299 (1989) (risks have more physical and social characteristics than mortality or mor-
bidity numbers; they have dimensions that are emotional, moral, political, and economic);
ENVIRONMENTAL EoUrrY, supra note 65, at 39 (public is particularly concerned about
"outrage factors" that offend a sense of fairness).
129. See Viscusi, supra note 124, at 296 (criticizing Proposition 65 warnings as
equivalent to a store grading all eggs as "jumbo").
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their perception of riskiness-they are dreaded, involve delayed im-
pacts, affect children, and are not well understood (compared to, for
example, an automobile accident). 30 People also tend to perceive the
probability of a hazard occurring based on how easy it is to imagine or
recall that particular threat. Known as the "availability" heuristic,
dramatic or sensational hazards or those subject to frequent media
coverage are commonly perceived as the most likely to occur.
131
Some evidence suggests that this heuristic causes people to overesti-
mate the likely occurrence of cancer.
Warning specialist Kip Viscusi argues that consumers will signifi-
cantly overestimate the risks associated with Proposition 65 warnings
because they use the signal word "Warning," because they do not
provide information about specific risks associated with them, and be-
cause the public has difficulty interpreting probabilistic
information. 132
On the other hand, other factors may lead consumers to under-
react to Proposition 65 warnings. For example, consumer products for
which Proposition 65 warnings are required largely entail risks which
130. See Slovic, supra note 125, at 282-83; NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, supra
note 53, at 97; Vincent T. Covello, Communicating Right-to-Know Information on Chemi-
cal Risks, 23 ENVTL. Scl. & TECi. 1444, 1447 (1989); Arthur C. Upton, Carcinogenic Risk
Assessment in Proper Perspective, 4 TOXICOLOGY & INDUS. HEALTH 443, 448-49 (1988)
(reporting that the average American considers cancer to be uncommon-despite the fact
that one in every four persons in the United States develops cancer, and one in every five
eventually dies of the disease-because the public perception of the risk of cancer is
colored by emotion).
131. Paul Slovic et al., Facts Versus Fears: Understanding Perceived Risk in JUDGMENT
UNDER UNCERTAINTY, supra note 125, at 463, 465-70.
132. Viscusi, supra note 124, at 290-98. Viscusi goes on to conclude that "[p]erhaps the
best case outcome possible is that consumers will disregard the labeling effort altogether as
being irresponsible and without informational content." Id. at 303. This broad condemna-
tion of the statute is not warranted for a number of reasons. First, Viscusi concludes that
the safe harbor message is too strong for exposures posing risks at or near the warning
threshold. See id. Many consumer product exposures, however, (as well as environmental
and occupational exposures) pose risks well above the warning level. Second, Viscusi's
critique is strongly colored by his belief that the statutory warning threshold is unduly
protective, see id. at 288 (the 1 in 100,000 level is "too low a risk level to pose a truly
significant risk for individual decisions"), but it is less stringent than other thresholds used
to impose substantive restrictions on carcinogens. Viscusi also believes that Proposition
65's risk assessment methodology is too stringent. See id In fact, it reflects standard risk
assessment methodology. Finally, Viscusi argues that "Warning" is too severe a signal
word for Proposition 65 warnings because it is used to convey the second-highest degree of
human hazard (intermediate between "Danger" and "Caution") in standards developed by
the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) (a widely followed private standard-
setting organization). Id at 290. But research suggests that in practice people do not ap-
preciate this hierarchy, and that "fi]f anything, 'Warning' often has a legal connotation of
'Notice' or 'take heed before you get penalized' and not one of safety hazard." BREwSTER
ET AL., supra note 65, at 21, 24-25; see also Michael S. Wogalter & N. Clayton Silver,
Arousal Strength of Signal Words, 3 FORENSIC REPORTS 407, 409, 417 (1990) (people do
not perceive differences between signal words "Warning" and "Caution").
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are voluntary and are likely to be perceived as within an individual's
control, factors that tend to decrease the level of perceived risk. 33
Likewise, people have a tendency to maintain their prior beliefs de-
spite later evidence to the contrary (known as the "anchoring" heuris-
tic). 134 Changing these initial risk perceptions requires persuasive
warnings. 35 In some situations, the safe harbor warning is not suffi-
cient to overcome preexisting beliefs about the general safety of con-
sumer products-e.g., a warning that a kitchen faucet "contains" lead
is unlikely to alter prior beliefs that use of the faucet causes no expo-
sure to lead in tap water.'
36
In their review of risk communication research relevant to right-
to-know laws, social scientists Brenda Nordenstam and Joseph
DiMento point out that people's reliance on stereotypical information
to judge the likelihood of something occurring, rather than on actual
rates of occurrence (known as the "representativeness" heuristic),
may lead to underestimations of Proposition 65 risks.' 37 Individuals
who do not believe that they possess certain stereotypical features
may incorrectly conclude that a particular activity subject to a Propo-
sition 65 warning does not pose a serious risk. Nordenstam and
DiMento also argue that other factors will likely result in under-reac-
tion to risk information conveyed by right-to-know laws. These fac-
tors include: the lack of obvious immediate adverse effects from
exposures to carcinogens (which in turn may ultimately undermine the
impact and credibility of warnings about such exposures), the limited
extent to which individuals seek out information, and the lack of con-
crete information in the warnings.' 38
Certain business practices are also likely to contribute to the pub-
lic's underestimation of any given risk. For example, some companies
have attempted to dilute perceptions of risk by including warning lan-
guage stating that Proposition 65 chemicals are listed on the basis of
laboratory animal tests. Notably, the HWA refused to accept this
133. See Slovic, supra note 125, at 282-83; NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, supra
note 53, at 97; Covello, supra note 130, at 1447.
134. Paul Slovic et al., Informing the Public About the Risks from Ionizing Radiation,
in JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY READER 114, 118 (Hal R.
Arkes & Kenneth Hammond eds., 1986).
135. See Viscusi and O'Connor, supra note 48, at 123-24; Wesley A. Magat & W. Kip
Viscusi, Implications for Economic Behavior, in LEARNING ABOUT RISK, supra note 48, at
125, 129; Hadden, Regulating Product Risks, supra note 8, at 98-100 (given that people's
risk perceptions are difficult to change and that warning labels are not very effective in
providing information, it is not surprising that warning labels are not strong enough to
change risk perceptions and invoke action).
136. See Bettman, et al., supra note 49, at 5 (noting that consumers are likely to under-
estimate risks of familiar household products).
137. Nordenstam & DiMento, supra note 35, at 363.
138. Id. at 363-65.
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statement as a safe harbor warning because it "may create the incor-
rect impression that chemicals for which only animal data exists pose
less of a risk than chemicals for which there is human data."'
1 39 This
judgment is sound; given the current knowledge base of most individ-
uals and absent other interpretive data, such language is more likely
to mislead consumers than to inform them accurately about risk
levels. A jury reached the same conclusion in Environmental Defense
Fund v. Parks Corp.140 In that case, the Proposition 65 warning at
issue stated that "methylene chloride has been shown to cause cancer
in certain laboratory animals." The jury found that the warning was
not clear and reasonable based on expert testimony that most people
think a laboratory animal warning implies a lower risk to humans.
14'
Other businesses have sought to reduce perceptions of risk by
using disclaimers that undermine or contradict the warning message
or imply that the risk levels involved are trivial.' 42 For example, one
consumer product warning reads:
WARNING: This product contains detectable quantities of chemicals
known to the State of California to cause cancer, birth defects or other
reproductive harm; however, the. chemicals may not be in sufficient
quantities to cause such cancer, birth defects, or other reproductive
harm. 14
3
In another instance, a residential developer distributed warning
materials stating that the presence of many Proposition 65 chemicals:
may be negligible or nonexistent in our construction. [Proposition 65]
does not regulate the amount of a substance that needs to be present
in order to be considered an exposure, or the length of time a person
needs to be in its vicinity. Any amount, no matter how negligible,
necessitates a warning being posted. 44
139. Final Statement, supra note 75, at 25. The Agency further explained that "the
reference to testing in lab animals could be construed to mean that there is no real danger
to humans, when in fact the potency of the chemical is high but there simply is no available
epidemiologic data." Id. at 46.
140. Environmental Defense Fund v. Parks Corp., No. 941281 (S.F. Super. Ct. filed
Mar. 11, 1992), summarized in Prop. 65 Litigation, supra note 15, at 27-28.
141. Jordan, supra note 15, at 34 & n.176. The warning language has been approved
for products containing methylene chloride by the Consumer Product Safety Commission
for warnings required under the Federal Hazardous Substances Act.
142. Consumer product warnings that include language in addition to that specified in
the regulations are not considered "safe harbor" warning messages. Final Statement, supra
note 75, at 5. The regulations, however, do not restrict businesses from including other
statements in the warnings.
143. Cited by OEHHA in Initial Statement, supra note 119, at 4.
144. Proposition 65 and Your New Home at 2 (Notice posted by Webb & Associates,
on file with author). The notice goes on to say:
You might also ask since many of these substances listed are commonly pres-
ent in the environment whether a pregnant woman should indeed be anywhere
but in a bubble with a controlled and protected environment.
Obviously, if you are pregnant you need to be cautious, but our model homes
and newly constructed homes probably do not pose any increased risk over the
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Finally, other disclaimers downplay the risk levels by imposing the
company's view of what is a "genuine" hazard or a "significant" health
danger-an inherently subjective judgment-on the warning recipi-
ent. Thus, for example, one warning states:
WARNING: This product contains a chemical known to the State of
California to cause cancer, birth defects or other reproductive harm.
This notice in no way implies that we have any evidence or experience
to indicate that any genuine hazard of cancer, birth defects, or repro-
ductive harm results from the normal, proper handling described on
our labels and related literature.
145
Another deficiency in the warnings is that the current safe harbor
message fails to alert recipients to the uncertainties involved in the
risk assessment process itself.146 Underlying every warning is (or
should be) a minimum determination that individuals exposed to a
listed chemical face an additional risk of contracting cancer greater
than 1 in 100,000, assuming lifetime exposure at the level in question
(or a risk of reproductive harm greater than the statutory threshold).
As critics on all sides have noted, this risk assessment process is filled
with imprecision and scientific uncertainties. 47 Thus, while warnings
home you are presently living in. The only difference is that regulation requires
that we post a warning notice.
Id (emphasis in original).
145. See Initial Statement, supra note 119, at 3. A warning provided for brass faucets
includes an introductory paragraph, and the following statement, before the safe harbor
message:
Preliminary industry tests have indicated that users of faucets made from brass
face no significant health danger. Although brass has been used in faucets for at
least sixty years, we are unaware of any proven harmful effects attributable to
them since that time. Proposition 65, however, requires that we provide you with
the following notice.
Warning provided by Universal-Rundle Corporation.
146. Stenzel, supra note 53, at 512-16. See also John P. Dwyer, Innovative Risk Regula-
tion Under Proposition 65, PROP 65 NEWS, Feb. 1992, at 31 (calling Proposition 65 warnings
"simple and simplistic"). The risk assessment process consists of four principal steps: (1)
Hazard identification: determining whether a particular chemical is causally related to a
health effect; (2) Dose-response assessment: determining the relationship between the
magnitude of the exposure and the probability of occurrence of the health effect in ques-
tion; (3) Exposure assessment: determining the extent of human exposure to a particular
chemical; and (4) Risk characterization: describing the nature and magnitude of risk associ-
ated with exposure to the chemical. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, RISK ASSESsMENT IN
THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT:, MANAGING THE PROCESS 19-21 (1983) [hereinafter RISK As-
SESSMENT IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT].
147. For cancer risk assessments, these include, among many others, uncertainties
about exposure information and assumptions, dose-response curves, scaling factors, confi-
dence limits, exposure to especially sensitive populations, and cumulative and synergistic
risks. An oft-cited study about risk assessment by the National Research Council identi-
fied 50 quantitative risk assessment "components," each with "inference options," requir-
ing the risk assessor to select between different plausible scientific judgments about
uncertain data or theoretical connections. RISK ASSESSMENT IN THE FEDERAL GOVERN-
MENT, supra note 146, at 28-33. At each point, the consequences of selecting one assump-
tion over another are substantial. See Howard Latin, Good Science, Bad Regulation, and
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should provide the public with some meaningful information regard-
ing the level of risk from exposure, such warnings should simultane-
ously inform recipients of the uncertainties in the risk assessment
process.
3. Environmental Warnings
a. Presentation of Warnings
Crafting warning regulations for environmental exposures
presented the most difficult challenge for the HWA. There were few,
if any, relevant precedents among regulatory warning programs.
148
The scope of this category is also problematic because it encompasses
a wide range of exposures-from the application of pesticides to a
residential lawn, to exposures affecting visitors at a commercial facil-
ity, to industrial air emissions impacting a neighborhood two miles
away.
The regulations identify three types of "safe harbor" warning
methods and mandate that the "most appropriate" of the three under
the circumstances be employed. 149 The methods, drawn from the stat-
ute, are: signs in the affected area (i.e., facility signs); a quarterly
mailed notice; and a quarterly public media announcement targeting
the affected area.' 50
The HWA was markedly ineffective in articulating specific gui-
dance for ascertaining which methods should be employed in a partic-
ular instance, asserting that the determination was "case-specific."' 151
The most troubling consequence of this lack of guidance is that almost
all businesses have used newspaper notices rather than mailed notices
Toxic Risk Assessment, 5 YALE J. ON REG. 89, 91-92 (1988); see also Adam M. Finkel, A
Second Opinion on an Environmental Misdiagnosis: The Risky Prescriptions of BREAKING
Tm VIcious CIRCLE, 3 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 295 (1995) (arguing that risk assessment may
systematically underestimate risk by not accounting for human variation in susceptibility to
cancer or by only measuring subsets of substances to which persons are exposed).
There are many similar uncertainties involved in reproductive toxicity risk assess-
ments, including the critical assumption of a threshold for the dose-response curve for
reproductive effects. See Carole A. Kimmel, Approaches to Evaluating Reproductive
Hazards and Risks, 101 ENvTL. HEALTH PERSP. SUPP. 137, 138 (1993).
148. Although other statutes require disclosure of information to the public, most no-
tably EPCRA, they do not mandate the provision of community warnings. See 42 U.S.C.
§§ 11001-11050 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
149. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 26, § 22-12601(d)(1) (1995).
150. Id. §§ 22-12601(d)(1)(A)-(C).
151. HWA explained that signs may be appropriate where the exposure occurs on-site,
or in surrounding neighborhoods, but at some point the distance from the source becomes
too great for this to be effective. It added that "mailed-warnings may be effective for off-
site exposures, but the logistics of providing such warnings on a large scale may be prohibi-
tive. Media warnings may be well-suited to warn large segments of the population, but not
plant visitors." Final Statement, supra note 75, at 41, 42.
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to warn affected residents of offsite environmental exposures. 152
Since individual mailings are by their nature far more likely to be seen
and read than newspaper notices, this method dramatically reduces
the visibility of the warnings. Only around sixty percent of the adult
population reads daily newspapers. 153 Of this group, only around
forty-five percent view every page.' 54 Newspapers have hundreds of
advertisements (advertising constitutes roughly sixty-five percent of
newspaper space), 155 and readers typically view only a fraction of
them. 56
The regulations do not specify any format or design for environ-
mental warnings. 157 A general limitation similar to that for consumer
product warnings applies; a warning must be provided in a conspicu-
ous manner and "under conditions which make it likely to be read,
seen, or heard and understood by an ordinary individual in the course
of normal daily activity."'
1 58
However, this restriction has generally been ignored by busi-
nesses, and most warnings are inconspicuous. Facility signs' size,
placement, and noticeability have varied considerably.' 59 Some warn-
ings are hidden behind counters or placed at foot level at building
entrances. Few, if any, signs use design features to increase their sali-
ence. Likewise, almost all newspaper warnings have not been well
designed to attract attention. 160 Some of the warnings have been
placed in the classified section of newspapers, and others in the legal
notices section with bankruptcy notices and foreclosure announce-
152. Telephone Interview with Craig Thompson, supra note 97. Notable exceptions
are major utility companies such as Pacific Gas & Electric (PG&E) and San Diego Gas &
Electric (SDG&E), which have sent quarterly warnings with their customer bills. Id.
153. Tim Jones, Newspapers Rush Across Technological Threshold To Secure a Future,
CHI. TRm., Apr. 10, 1994, at C1.
154. B. Stewart Tolley & Leo Bogart, How Readers Process Newspaper Advertising, in
ATTENTION, ATIrITUDE AND AFFECT IN RESPONSE TO ADVERTISING, supra note 103, at 69,
70.
155. C. EDWIN BAKER, ADVERTISING AND A DEMOCRATIC PRESS 45 (1994).
156. See Tolley & Bogart, supra note 154, at 70-73. Moreover, even though eye camera
studies demonstrate that readers technically "see" many advertisements, any particular ad
will not be read unless the reader recognizes the topic as inherently interesting or useful.
Id. at 71, 73-74.
157. The only guidance provided is for signs in the affected area; posting in compliance
with CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 3, § 6776(e)(1) is sufficient to comply with Proposition 65 (but
not required). CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 26, § 22-12601(d)(1)(A) (1995). Section 6676(e)(1)
requires that signs be posted at the usual points of entry to the affected area. CAL. CODE
REGS. tit. 3, § 6776(e)(1) (1995).
158. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 26, § 22-12601(d)(2) (1995).
159. Telephone Interview with Craig Thompson, supra note 97; Telephone Interview
with Caraway, supra note 97.
160. This discussion, and that in infra part IV.B., is based largely on several hundred
newspaper advertisements from 1988 to 1995 clipped by Burrelle's clipping service. Copies




ments. 161 Many warnings have physical characteristics that render
them inconspicuous and difficult to read. Some design techniques for
newspaper warnings include formatting the warning in small one-col-
umn listings or presenting the warning as one block of continuous
copy, with no paragraphs, headings, or changes in type size. Others
are single spaced, some are all capitalized, 162 and many have small
print. Only a handful use graphics or pictorials, and many do not use
"Warning" as a signal word. Such inconspicuous warnings face the
insurmountable task of competing with commercial advertisements,
photographs and eye-catching headlines for the attention of newspa-
per readers.
b. Content of Warnings
i. Communication of Exposure Information
The regulations mandate "safe harbor" warning language only for
facility signs (i.e., on-site exposures). This language, used in most fa-
cility signs, states: "WARNING: This area contains a chemical
known to the state to cause cancer [birth defects or other reproductive
harm]."'1 63 Some warnings use the more abstruse phrase, "detectable
quantities of chemicals" are found in the area.164
There is no safe harbor language for off-site exposures, and busi-
nesses have been left free to devise their own warnings. 165 The great
majority of these warnings do not state that their facilities emit or
release chemicals or that facility emissions result in human exposures.
Standard warning language states that the facility "uses" or "contains"
chemicals 66 or that chemicals "are present" or "may be found" in or
near the facility.167 A considerable number never even use the word
"warning." Most warnings also fail to demarcate the areas in which
exposures occur. This radius could extend from a block to five miles
from the facility site. Finally, the warnings often exclude other infor-
161. See James Wheaton & Susan Jordan, New Warning Regs: Better Regs for Better
Business, 6 PRoP 65 NEWS, Oct. 1992, at 7 (stating that some companies have "plac[ed]
incomprehensible and virtually invisible 'notices' buried in classified sections where their
presence is 'reasonably calculated' to be ignored").
162. Warnings printed in all capital letters are harder to read than warnings with upper
and lower case letters. BREWSTER, supra note 65, at 12.
163. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 26, § 22-12601(d)(3)(A),(B) (1995).
164. See Initial Statement, supra note 119, at 4.
165. The regulations state only that all warnings for environmental exposures shall be
"reasonably associated with the location and source of the exposure." Id § 22-
12601(d)(2).
166. See Notice of Rohr, Inc.
167. See Notice of Chem-Tronics, Inc.
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mation concerning the various means of exposure or precautionary
measures to avoid or minimize the risks.
168
.A substantial number of newspaper warnings, particularly warn-
ings published jointly by companies within a single industry, do not
identify the facility(ies) causing exposures.169 For example, one ongo-
ing oil industry warning covers exposures from "gas stations, refin-
eries, chemical plants, oil and gas wells, oil and gas treating plants,
petroleum and chemical storage tanks, pipeline systems, tank trucks
and cars, loading and unloading facilities.' u70 The warning is pub-
lished on behalf of twenty-three oil companies and their subsidiaries
operating throughout California, without providing an address or lo-
cation for any of the thousands of facilities covered.
171
Rather than warn, almost all environmental warnings impart a
message that is uninformative, personally irrelevant, and potentially
confusing to the reader. For example, a warning in the lobby of a
fifteen-story office building stating that the building "contains" listed
chemicals, without any identification of the source and location of the
chemicals, has little informational value to the recipient and is likely
to be confusing. 172 Likewise, after some home developers posted
warnings stating that "this area contains [listed] chemicals," ostensibly
warning persons about exposures to chemicals in materials used in
new home construction, OEHHA received queries from puzzled re-
cipients asking whether the warning meant that their housing tract
was built on a hazardous waste site, whether the drinking water in the
area was contaminated, or whether there was a nearby facility emit-
ting toxic chemicals into the air.173 Thus, as with consumer products,
the environmental exposure warnings do not convey the central infor-
mation about exposure necessary to effectuate the informational
objectives of the statute.
ii. Communication of Risk Information
As with consumer product warnings, environmental exposure
warnings do not include any explanatory information about the level
or nature of risk caused by exposures. Many contain additional infor-
168. See supra notes 119-23 and accompanying text. See also Edward Black, Califor-
nia's Community Right-to-Know, 16 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1021, 1049-50 (1989) (arguing that the
public needs information about health effects, exposure levels, and how released chemicals
interact with the environment to put EPCRA data into context).
169. See, e.g., Notice of the Southern California Paint & Coatings Association; Notice
of Aggregate Material Producers in San Diego County.
170. E.g., Notice published in Los ANGELES TiMEs, Aug. 26, 1991, at A17.
171. Id.
172. The same is true when persons living two miles from a facility read a newspaper
ad stating that the facility "may contain" a listed chemical.
173. See Initial Statement, supra note 119, at 7.
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mation that affirmatively hinders accurate understanding of risk infor-
mation. A considerable number of warnings explicitly disclaim the
need to give a warning by stating that the company "is giving this no-
tice even though we believe actual emission levels at our facility are
within applicable regulatory limits.' 74 Some warning ads seek to
minimize the risk levels by portraying the risks involved as "accepta-
ble." One such ad states: "[Our] policy is to design, manufacture and
distribute all products and to handle and dispose of all materials safely
and without causing any unacceptable risks to health, safety or the
environment."'1 75 As discussed above, however, the "acceptability" of
risk is an inherently subjective issue. When the risks are involuntary,
outside of any individual's control, and unfair, (benefitting a particular
company while imposing costs on a large community), the public is
likely to evaluate risks from a much different perspective than that of
the company.176
In many warnings, the exposure notice is accompanied by dis-
claimers as well as lengthy introductions and self-serving statements
about the company's health and safety record. For example, in one
small warning ad, roughly half the text is devoted to a statement that
avers: "The companies listed below independently declare their com-
mitment to an environmentally safe and clean community, and sepa-
rately, through each company's individual programs, continually strive
to insure compliance with local, state and federal environmental,
health and safety regulations.' 77
A warning advertisement published by McDonnell Douglas Cor-
poration bears the heading "McDonnell Douglas Corporation Wants
You to Know,". and states that: "as a longtime leader of aerospace
manufacturing, McDonnell Douglas Corporation (MDC) has always
made safety and a clean environment among our top priorities. What
you may not know is that MDC has an equal interest in the health and
safety of you-our neighbors.' 7 This type of filler material domi-
nates many notices, effectively turning off the reader's attention en-
tirely or trivializing any risks involved. The net effect is that such
warnings read like public relations promotions and frustrate the accu-
rate comprehension of risk data.
174. Notice of Fleetwood Enterprises, Inc.
175. Notice of Allied-Signal, Inc.
176. See Covello, supra note 130, at 1446-48; HADDEN, A CrriZEN's RIGHT To KNOW,
supra note 8, at 149.
177. The notice then states that the "following facilities may contain chemicals known
to the State of California to cause cancer, birth defects, or other reproductive harm," and
lists the names of the four companies (with no addresses). Public Notice, SAN DIEGO
UNION-TRIB. (Oct. 12, 1994).




a. Presentation of Warnings
HWA implementing regulations identify three types of "safe har-
bor" warning methods for occupational warnings. One is a label on
products or substances used in the workplace. 179 A second is a sign in
the workplace. 180 The third is a warning method that complies with
the requirements of the Hazard Communication Standard (HCS)
adopted by OSHA, or for pesticides, the comparable Pesticide and
Worker Safety requirements of the California Food and Agriculture
Code.181
The HCS requires employers to provide information to their em-
ployees concerning hazardous chemicals through labels on hazardous
products, Material Safety Data Sheets (MSDSs) about hazardous
products, and training sessions to educate employees about the iden-
tity, use, and control of hazardous substances.' 82 Because many of the
chemicals covered under Proposition 65 are already subject to the
HCS, businesses have been able to rely largely on the above notifica-
tion scheme to provide warnings.' 83 Where additional warnings are
required, most employers have responded by posting a boilerplate
sign stating, "This area contains chemicals known to the State of Cali-
fornia to cause cancer [or reproductive harm]."' 84  As with warnings
for other environmental media, the regulations do not prescribe size,
location, or other specifics about the format of workplace warnings.'
85
179. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 26, § 22-12601(c)(1)(A) (1995). The warning must be dis-
played on the product or substance "under circumstances which make it likely that the
warnings will be read and understood by employees ... prior to [ I exposure." Id.
180. Id. § 22-12601(c)(1)(B). The warning must be posted "under conditions [that]
make it likely [that it will] be read and understood by employees... prior to []exposure."
Id.
181. Id. § 22-12601(c)(1)(C). While warning methods required by HCS are considered
safe harbors under Proposition 65, the warning message is not.
182. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200 (1994). In California, Cal/OSHA enforces the State's com-
parable Hazard Communication Standard in lieu of the federal HCS. See CAL. LAB. CODE
§§ 6360-6399.9 (West 1996); CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 8, § 5194 (1995).
183. For some chemicals, however, Proposition 65's warning threshold is more strin-
gent than the HCS. For example, if a carcinogen is present in a mixture, the HCS is trig-
gered if the concentration of the carcinogen is greater than one-tenth of one percent.
Proposition 65's warning requirement, by contrast, is triggered by the actual level of
worker exposure to the chemical.
184. This discussion of occupational warnings is based on telephone interviews with
Len Walsh, Cal-OSHA Legal Unit, May 19, 1995; Mike Horowitz and Deborah Gold, Cal-
OSHA San Mateo Dist. Office, May 19, 1995; Scott McAllister, Cal-OSHA Oakland Re-
gional Office, May 19, 1995; Jerry Niesler, Cal-OSHA Southern California Regional Office,
May 29, 1995; Joyce Simonowitz, Cal-OSHA Southern California Regional Office, June 1,
1995; and Joe Enos, United Auto Workers Ergonomics, Health & Safety Representative,
New United Motors Inc. (NUMI), Fremont, CA, May 22, 1995.
185. Occupational warnings are subject to the same general requirements of conspicu-
ousness as consumer product warnings, namely, that circumstances make it likely that the
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Most employers post warnings at the main entrance to the facility or
workroom; these warnings are generally visible to employees. Others
appear on employee bulletin boards, or elsewhere in the facility. A
few products in the workplace have small Proposition 65 warnings
pasted on top of product labels, and some MSDSs also include the
safe harbor message. 186 Few warnings, if any at all, use symbols, icons,
color graphics, print size, placement, or other means to capture work-
ers' attention.
b. Content of Warnings
i. Communication of Exposure Information
The regulations identify two safe harbor warning messages for oc-
cupational exposures. For signs in the workplace, the warning lan-
guage reads: "WARNING: This area contains a chemical known to
the state to cause cancer [birth defects or other reproductive
harm]."'1 87 For warnings located on a product or substance label, the
safe harbor language for consumer products applies.'88 These
messages have generally been used by businesses providing warnings.
The workplace sign safe harbor message does not effectively com-
municate exposure information to employees. The warning refers
only to a general work area as "containing" listed chemicals, without
focusing on any particular exposures. 189 The message does not spec-
ify, either by generic or chemical name, the chemicals applicable to
the warning, or even if exposure to more than one chemical is occur-
ring. Thus, workers have no way of knowing whether the warnings
refer to substances subject to the HCS or whether the message refers
to additional Proposition 65 chemicals for which a warning is required.
Workers are not likely to expend significant effort to obtain this data,
since research indicates that employees' level of information-seeking
is very low.' 90 Moreover, as with other warnings, the message fails to
inform employees that they are actually being exposed to listed
chemicals.
As noted above, the warnings do not include symbols or icons.
This particularly hinders employee comprehension of occupational
warnings, given estimates that approximately twenty percent of Amer-
warnings will be read and understood prior to exposure. CAL. CODE REGs. tit. 26, § 22-
12601(c)(1)-(3) (1995).
186. This will typically be included in the "ingredients" section, or the section discuss-
ing "other regulatory information." See id.
187. Id. § 22-12601(c)(3)(A),(B).
188. Id. § 22-12601(c)(2).
189. See Viscusi, supra note 124, at 292.
190. See Nordenstam & DiMento, supra note 35, at 354.
19961
ECOLOGY LAW QUARTERLY
ican workers are functionally illiterate' 91 and that a sizeable segment
of the California workforce is non-English speaking or has limited
English language skills.192 These workers are disproportionately con-
centrated in industries with high exposure to toxic chemicals. 193
ii. Communication of Risk Information
Occupational exposure warnings do not include other informa-
tion that would give workers a better understanding of the risks they
are encountering, such as that provided to workers when workplace
exposures are coverdd by the HCS. This includes information such as
chemical and physical characteristics of the substances, composition,
ways to avoid exposure, health hazards from exposure, precautions to
minimize harm from exposure, and treatments for harm from expo-
sure. 194 For exposures subject to the HCS, Proposition 65's warnings
do not enhance what workers already know. Overall, Proposition 65
has had little tangible impact on informing workers about risks from
occupational exposures.
5. Summary
Proposition 65's consumer product, environmental, and occupa-
tional warnings have been of very limited informational value. Many
warnings go unnoticed, fail to inform the public adequately about its
exposure to listed chemicals, and fail to communicate effectively the
risk levels involved. Thus, all three types of warnings have poorly
served the statute's goals of promoting informed choice and enhanced
decisionmaking, and satisfying the public's right to know.
191. Oldenburg, supra note 103, at B5 (quoting E. Patrick McGuire, a psychologist
specializing in communications).
192. In California, for instance, it is estimated that 80% of migrant farmworkers are
Latino. Many of these workers have limited education and read at about a fifth-grade level
in their native language. ENVIRONMENTAL Eourrv, supra note 65, § 6.2.1, at 48.
193. Friedman-Jimdnez, supra note 69, at 606-07, 610. For example, Asian immigrant
workers are overrepresented in the electronics industry, cosmetology, and drycleaning, in
positions that involve exposure to toxic chemicals. Chu, supra note 71, at 10; Yoo, supra
note 71, at 11.
194. See 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200 (1994); Haig, supra note 59, at 714; Stenzel, supra note
53, at 520-23. The HCS is intended to serve broader training and educational purposes
than Proposition 65.
The warnings are also unlikely to counter the denial mechanisms that may affect
worker response to warnings. Research suggests that workers who do not view their expo-
sures as voluntary tend to deny the level of risk to which they are exposed. This may very
well be a psychological coping mechanism for workers who are required by economic ne-
cessity to remain at their jobs. See Nordenstam & DiMento, supra note 35, at 354-55.
Workers who perceive that they have no control over the risks they face also may deny that
any risk is present. See id. at 356.
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C. Does Proposition 65 Satisfy Its Goal of Reducing Exposures to
Hazardous Substances?
1. Consumer Product Exposures
Despite the prevalence of poor warnings, Proposition 65's warn-
ing requirement has stimulated significant consumer-product reformu-
lation, due to a combination of industry concerns about liability and
consumer reaction to warnings.195 In some instances, the reformula-
tions have been close to industry-wide, reflecting the competitive
pressures that arise once a portion of the industry alters its products.
Almost all the reformulated products are being sold nationwide, giv-
ing the statute national effect. 196 Moreover, the reported product re-
formulations probably represent only a portion of private businesses'
actions. As one business columnist suggests, "most of the good arising
from Proposition 65 remains hidden, in the form of companies that
quietly assess what they're doing, and presumably, clean up their act
to avoid the brouhaha that might arise from having to tell all the
neighbors they're being poisoned."' 97
Enforcement actions have triggered many product reformula-
tions. Nearly forty manufacturers of glazed ceramicware (china) have
agreed to reduce lead levels in their flatware by. fifty percent and in
their hollowware by twenty-five percent within five years. 198 Two
companies have become entirely lead-free. 199 The Environmental De-
fense Fund has estimated that the lead content of over 8000 patterns
of china has been reduced.2°° This widespread reformulation has a
195. See generally supra part II.B.
196. Frank Clifford, State Curbs on Household Chemicals Under Attack, L.A. TIMES,
Feb. 22, 1995, at Al.
197. Daniel Akst, Quiet Legacy of Once-Hated Proposition 65, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 28,
1992, at Dl, D5; see CaI/EPA Proposition Review Panel, Results of Proposition 65 Survey
28 (1992) [hereinafter Review Panel Survey] (informal survey of business attitudes and
compliance efforts, on file with author) (most businesses surveyed agreed with "quiet com-
pliance" characterization of Proposition 65); Randolph B. Smith, California Spurs Refor-
mulated Products, WALL ST. J., Nov. 1, 1990, at BI (reporting that some companies are
quietly reformulating their products to avoid calling attention to chemicals in their old
products); Beth Gaston, Living with Proposition 65, 21 CAL. J. 115, 118 (1990) (stating that
companies are quietly reformulating their products in order to stay out of the news); Jor-
dan, supra note 15, at 3, 4 (reporting anecdotal evidence that businesses are keeping their
compliance efforts quiet because of embarrassment or pressure within the business com-
munity); Elliot Diringer, Prop. 65 Begins to Affect Products, Buying Habits, S.F. CHRON.,
Oct. 20, 1988, at Al, A8 (stating that companies prefer not to talk about product
reformulations).
198. See Prop. 65 Litigation, supra note 15, at 15.
199. Hearings, supra note 5, at 146-47 (testimony of David Roe, Environmental De-
fense Fund).
200. Jane E. Allen, How California Led a Move To Cut Lead, PHILA. INQUIRER, Dec.
2, 1994, at F8 (quoting estimates of Environmental Defense Fund that over 8000 patterns
of china now meet Proposition 65's standard for lead, while only 600 met the standard in
1992).
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significant national impact, since approximately 1.2 billion pieces of
ceramicware are sold in the United States every year.20
1
A large segment of the nail polish industry agreed to remove tol-
uene from dozens of consumer and professional nail polish prod-
ucts. 202 Manufacturers have agreed to reformulate dozens of
automobile paints, coatings, adhesives, and related products. 203 Ap-
proximately three hundred wineries, representing a large share of the
domestic wine industry, agreed to phase out their use of lead foil caps
on wine bottles.2°4
Three major water pump companies agreed to remove lead from
their submersible well water pumps. 20 5 Several manufacturers devel-
oped paint strippers containing substances other than methylene chlo-
ride. 206 The three major producers of typewriter correction fluids-
Gillette Co., Wite-Out Co., and Wirth International-reformulated
their typewriter correction fluids to remove trichloroethylene. 2 7 In
1991, Dow Brand, Inc., agreed to reformulate K2r spot-remover to
remove perchloroethylene. 2 8 The manufacturers of Preparation H
and Valu-Rite hemorrhoidal treatments eliminated phenyl mercuric
nitrate (PMN) from their products, products commonly used by preg-
nant women.20 9 Baccarat, Inc. developed a "cementation" process for
201. Hearings, supra note 5, at 137 (testimony of David Roe) (quoting estimates of
ceramicware industry); see also Donna Horowitz, Are Your Dishes Leaching Too Much
Lead?, S.F. EXAMINER, June 28, 1995, at Z1 (manufacturers report that as time goes on,
increasing numbers of tableware patterns do not require Proposition 65 warnings because
of manufacturers' efforts to implement improved technologies).
202. The agreements, however, provide that warnings may be given in lieu of
reformulation.
203. Letter from Chanler & Associates to author (July 27, 1995) (on file with author);
see also Makers of Auto Paint Finishes Agree To Reformulate Products, 5 Cal. Env't Rep.
(BNA) 143-44 (Mar. 10, 1993). The nonprofit organization that initiated these enforce-
ment actions, As You Sow, estimates that overall seventy companies in the nail polish and
paint industries have agreed to reformulate over 1000 different products, involving 10 mil-
lion product units. Telephone Interview with Clifford Chanler, Attorney for As You Sow
(May 30, 1995). This number is difficult to verify, since many of the agreements with these
companies give them the option of paying civil penalties or providing warnings if they elect
not to reformulate their products.
204. Prop. 65 Litigation, supra note 15, at 13; Telephone Interview with Robert
Thomas, Investigator, California Attorney General's Office (May 15, 1995).
205. Dennis Pfaff, Pump Makers Settle Lead Claim, S.F. DAILY J., Aug. 7, 1995, at 3.
The pumps are used to draw out drinking water from private wells, and are used mostly in
rural areas where residents are not hooked up to municipal drinking-water systems. Id.
206. Marina Gatti, Proposition 65: 'Shoot First, Ask Questions Later': Do the Bullets
Really Work? Have We Shot the Wrong Party? Will They Call Out the Bazookas? 47 Food
& DRUG L.J. 739, 741 n.14. Some companies simply stopped selling methylene chloride-
containing paint strippers in California. Id.
207. See Prop 65 Litigation, supra note 15, at 4.
208. See id. at 24.
209. See id. at 17.
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its leaded crystal decanter that prevents the leaching of lead into
stored liquids ingested by consumers. 210
Most recently, twelve major manufacturers of brass faucets
agreed to reduce substantially the lead content of their products and
make ninety-five percent of their faucets virtually lead-free by 1999.211
These companies supply ninety percent of the California market and
account for the bulk of faucet sales nationally.212
Other reported instances of product reformulation have occurred
absent direct enforcement. Old El Paso canned foods eliminated its
use of lead-soldered cans,213 as did a Mexican canner/importer.2 1
4
Major Paint removed methylene chloride from forty-five of its Xy-
nolyte Brand products.215 Sunoco reformulated the inks in plastic
grocery bags to eliminate listed chemicals. 216 Sara Lee's Kiwi Brand
Products reformulated its shoe-waterproofing sprays to remove listed
chemicals. 217 Sears Roebuck & Company reported that its supplier
reformulated dozens of products, including car wax and carburetor
cleaner.2 18 An herbicide manufacturer altered its products to remove
arsenic, a listed chemical. 219
The extraordinary steps taken by businesses to avoid consumer
product warnings can be partially explained by liability concerns. In
Proposition 65 enforcement suits, the California Attorney General's
Office and private parties have been willing to forego imposing civil
fines on defendant companies in exchange for product reformulation,
and indeed have made this a goal of their enforcement policies. 220
210. See id at 12.
211. Todd Woody, Faucet Makers Will Reduce Lead, Warn Consumers, RECORDER,
Sept. 1, 1995, at 1; Rick Lovett, Final Faucets Case Settled, 10 PROP 65 NEWS, Feb. 1996, at
4.
212. Woody, supra note 211.
213. Smith, supra note 197, at B1.
214. CALIFORNIA'S EXPERIENCE, supra note 6, at 27.
215. Telephone Interview with Thompson, supra note 97.
216. CALIFORNIA'S EXPERIENCE, supra note 6, at 27.
217. Smith, supra note 197, at B1.
218. Id.
219. Kristen Stevens, supra note 82, at 128. The company first acknowledged, then
disputed, that the reformulation was prompted by Proposition 65. Id. at 128 n.223.
220. See Jordan, supra note 15, at 32-33; Daniel Lungren, California's Attorney Gen-
eral, described the impact of his office's Proposition 65 enforcement policy as follows:
"[T]hrough our Proposition 65 enforcement .... we have pressed manufacturers who are
in violation of the law to make some fundamental changes in their products-to go beyond
posting warnings-by in many cases eliminating the presence of the toxic substance in
their products altogether." Daniel E. Lungren, Proposition 65-A Balanced Approach, 6
PROP 65 NEWS, Feb. 1992, at 1, 6 (emphasis in original); Woody, Painted into a Corner,
supra note 25, at 16 (quoting a public interest attorney involved in Proposition 65 litigation:
"EDF has been willing to forgive back penalties in lieu of [toxics reductions]").
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Facing statutory fines that can be enormous, 221 many companies have
consented to reformulate their products in order to reduce their po-
tential liability. Other companies have reformulated as a prophylactic
measure to avoid the possibility of a lawsuit entirely, given the stat-
ute's large penalties and the relatively unpredictable nature of citizen
enforcement. Some, moreover, may worry that providing warnings
could encourage the filing of tort actions.222 However, because Prop-
osition 65 enforcement actions cannot force reformulation, 223 and
since businesses can avoid future liability by providing warnings rather
than altering their products, other factors have also contributed to the
reformulations.
More significant than the desire to minimize liability is corporate
concern over consumer reaction to product warnings, and the power
of green consumerism in the marketplace. Consumer demand can be
extremely sensitive to the disclosure of adverse health and safety
product information, particularly in food products. 224 Businesses per-
ceive the possibility of significant sales losses by disclosing toxic chem-
ical presence in certain consumer products, and warnings for these
products have, consequently, become anathema to business.225 Some
221. The statute imposes civil penalties of up to $2,500 per day per violation. CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25249,7(b) (West 1992). The courts are likely to interpret each
exposure without an adequate warning (i.e., each person buying a consumer product with-
out a warning) as a separate violation. This is similar to the view adopted by the courts
under the penalty provisions of the Unfair Business Practices Act, Bus. & PROF. CODE
§§ 17206(a), 17536(a) (West 1996). See People v. Toomey, 203 Cal. Rptr. 642, 655-57 (Ct.
App. 1984).
222. There is no evidence to date that warnings have triggered any tort actions. The
Proposition 65 regulations provide that the "no significant risk" levels established under
the statute, shall not be construed to establish exposure or risk levels for other regulatory
purposes, which includes tort actions. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 26, § 22-12701(d) (1995).
Moreover, in any tort action alleging failure to warn, a Proposition 65 warning could be
used as a defense. Nonetheless, businesses may worry that a warning could increase the
likelihood of tort suits by alerting consumers to exposures of which they would otherwise
remain unaware.
223. Enforcing parties have not insisted on reformulation as an element of settlement.
See Edward G. Weil, Proposition 65 Enforcement Activities and Policies of the Attorney
General, 6 PROP 65 NEWS, Feb. 1992, at 48, 51 (product reformulation is not a precondition
to settlement of actions brought by the Attorney General's Office).
224. The strong public reaction to reports about the cancer risks posed by Alar on red
apples is one vivid, if extreme, illustration of public concern about food safety. See Scott
Kilman, Safety First: Food Companies React to Consumers' Fears About What They Eat,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 19, 1990, at Al (wholesale apple prices dropped by 50% after reports of
Alar use in apples). Another example is consumer response to Perrier's disclosure in 1990
that some of its bottled water had elevated levels of benzene. (The levels were 12.2 to 19.9
parts per billion, compared to the FDA's limit of 5 parts per billion. The FDA estimated
these levels would result in an increased cancer risk of one in a million). After disclosure,
Perrier lost close to 25% of its market share of bottled water, and its sales decreased by
40%. See HALE N. TONGREN, CASES IN CONSUMER BEHAVIOR 41-49 (1994).
225. Jay Matthews, California Uses "Legal Judo" on Toxics, WASH. POST, July 30, 1991,
at A3 (corporations are uncomfortable with warning labels on their products); see also
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argue that Proposition 65 warnings play on this consumer sensitivity
by stigmatizing products with warnings likely to encourage consumer
overreaction.2 26 In this view, overly simple warnings further the statu-
tory goal of product reformulation.
Businesses also worry about the reaction of retailers, who may
refuse to carry the products because of concerns about their own lia-
bility or because they believe the products will be unpopular with con-
sumers.227 For example, major retailers have pressured tableware
manufacturers to reformulate their products by informing them that
they will not stock patterns requiring warnings. 228 As a Williams-So-
noma manager explained:
From the beginning, our customers asked us about ceramicware. It
was clear they didn't want to be exposed to even a little bit of lead....
We saw the handwriting on the wall in the late '80's and early '90's. It
was quite easy for us to offer ceramicware that doesn't leach detecta-
ble lead.22 9
Given the intense competition among thousands of consumer prod-
ucts for shelf space in retail stores,230 manufacturers rightfully fear the
consequences of having retailers pull their products from the shelves
for even brief periods.
At the same time, selling a reformulated product can lead to a
competitive market advantage. 231 The explosive growth of consumer
Stevens, supra note 82, at 126 (research cited by California Attorney General's office indi-
cates that consumers will shift to products without Proposition 65 warnings).
226. See Noah, supra note 49, at 295; Viscusi, supra note 124, at 289-96 (Proposition 65
warnings are unduly alarmist and consumers are likely to exaggerate risks posed by them);
Gatti, supra note 206, at 760 (arguing that what he characterizes as misleading Proposition
65 labeling that heightens consumers' fears can lead to greater product reformulation).
227. See Richard Reuben, Making a Business Out of Prop 65, CAL. LAW., Mar. 1992, at
18 (wholesalers and retailers have refused to carry products that do not have adequate
Proposition 65 warnings); Robert Reinhold, California Supermarket Chain Bars Some To-
bacco Products N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 1988, at Al (in response to a suit against tobacco
companies for failure to warn, Vons, the largest supermarket chain in Southern California,
pulls cigars, pipe tobacco and chewing tobacco products from its shelves; other supermar-
ket chains give tobacco firms deadline for providing Proposition 65 labels or else products
will be removed); George White, 5 Retailers Pull Spot Removers from Shelves, L.A. TIMES,
July 12, 1990, at D2 (in response to an enforcement suit, five retail chains pull spot remover
from shelves because it did not bear the Proposition 65 warning).
Retailers are especially reluctant to carry products for which warnings are provided on
shelf signs because of the administrative burden involved in maintaining the warnings. In-
terview with Deputy Attorney General Edward Weil, California Attorney General's Of-
fice, Oakland, CA (July 6, 1995).
228. Telephone Interview with Susan Chiang, Environmental Defense Fund, June 1,
1995; Horowitz, supra note 201, at ZI (Williams-Sonoma and its Pottery Barn stores, Pier
One Imports, and Cost Plus do not carry dishes requiring Proposition 65 warnings).
229. Horowitz, supra note 201, at Z1.
230. See Mark S. Albion, Advertising's Hidden Effects 74-76, 86 (1983) (allocation of
retail shelf space between products and product categories is one of most prominent deci-
sions retailers make to maximize profits).
231. Smith, supra note 197, at B1.
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interest in using everyday purchases as a means to achieve environ-
mental goals has resulted in a rush by businesses to market environ-
mentally sound products. Public opinion surveys show that a large
majority of the public wishes to purchase environmentally safe prod-
ucts; one poll found that seventy-five percent of consumers considered
the environmental reputation of the product or manufacturer to be an
important purchasing factor.232 Nearly one in every two consumers
has recently altered her purchases to help protect the environment.233
Gillette is a well-known example of a company which has sought
to use product reformulation as a marketing tool. In 1989, the State
and environmental groups threatened the company with an enforce-
ment action for failure to provide adequate warnings on its Liquid
Paper correction fluid. The company promptly removed two listed
chemicals, trichloroethylene (TCE) and lead, developed a new prod-
uct, and began a national advertising campaign promoting the product
as "New Improved" and one that "Complies With Proposition 65 En-
vironmental Guidelines. ''2 34 Likewise, the retail store displays of two
china manufacturers with reformulated tableware products "proudly
point out that they no longer use lead in their dishes. 2 35 Potent mar-
ket forces were also in evidence following a Proposition 65 lawsuit in
1994 and accompanying EPA advisory about lead in submersible
water pumps.2 36 Within two weeks of the suit being filed, consumer
demand for "Red Jacket" pumps, which have the lowest lead content
232. John M. Church, A Market Solution to Green Marketing: Some Lessons from the
Economics of Information, 79 MINN. L. REv. 245, 253 (1994); Terri Shaw, The Selling of
"Green"; Labels Use All the Buzz Words, but What Do They Mean, WASH. POST, Feb. 28,
1991, at T9.
233. Church, supra note 232, at 254. The number of products marketed with environ-
mental claims has rapidly increased in recent years, as has the number of "green" product
purchases. Id. at 277. The percentage of new products marketed in the United States with
packages, labels, or advertising containing environmental claims increased from 5.9% in
1989 to 11.4% in the first half of 1992. The market for green products constituted $121.5
billion in 1993, and is expected to grow to $154 billion by 1997. Casey Bukro, 'Green'
Goods Still Grab Green; Rising Consumer Demand Grows from Earth Day Seed, CHICAGO
TRmB., Apr. 22, 1994, at 1. A 1994 poll by Roper Starch Worldwide, Inc. found a 70% jump
in "green" product purchases from the prior year. Id. See also Adrian Higgins, Buying
Green, WASH. POST., Jan. 19, 1995, at T5 (noting large increase in number of advertisers in
National Green Pages).
234. Susan J. Stocker, Wite-Out Cleans Up Others' Mistakes, WASH. Bus. J., Aug. 27,
1990, at 1. In some instances reformulation has resulted in products that are marketed as
more effective as well as safer. Thus, in response to Gillette's reformulation, as well as its
own potential enforcement difficulties, Wite-Out (Gillette's main competitor) also re-
moved TCE and switched to another alternative that it could advertise as working on all
materials-copy paper, faxes, and ink. Id.
235. Horowitz, supra note 201, at ZI.
236. See John Cushman, U.S. Urges Users of New Well Pumps To Drink Bottled Water,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 1994, at Al. April 19, 1994 marked both the issuance of the EPA
warning and the filing of the Proposition 65 litigation. Id.
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of any water pumps, doubled.237 A little more than a year later, the
market pressure of competing with this company, as well as another
manufacturer of lead-free pumps (Grundfos), forced three other
water pump manufacturers to sell only lead-free products in
California.238
Proposition 65 has had notable success in reducing toxics in con-
sumer products, although two caveats should be noted. First, refor-
mulation may not always be completely beneficial. Products that are
reformulated may substitute chemicals that pose other risks of equal
or greater dimension than the Proposition 65 chemicals they re-
place.239 Likewise, a product may pose risks marginally above the
warning threshold yet have important benefits that would be impaired
by removing a listed chemical. From a risk/benefit perspective, refor-
mulation in this instance would not be desirable. 24° Second, reformu-
lation may constrain the choices of consumers who would otherwise
be willing to incur the added risk posed by a product.
241
From a policy perspective, these examples are most troubling if
driven by exaggerated consumer fears of the risks posed by products,
rather than consumers' deliberate and well-informed decisionmaking.
If the latter mechanism is responsible, then businesses are simply re-
sponding, appropriately, to the collectively expressed preferences of
the market.
The above discussion has focused on products for which substi-
tutes exist. Where there are no available substitutes, the marketplace
has fared poorly as a mechanism for achieving toxics reductions. In
these situations, businesses have provided warnings that exact little or
no cost in terms of reduced consumer demand. Thus, gas stations
throughout California contain warnings that "chemicals known to the
state to cause cancer, birth defects, or other reproductive harm are
found in gasoline, crude oil and many other petroleum products, and
ether vapors, or result from their use." Consumers do not have the
option of using a "safer" gasoline, since all brands contain benzene, a
listed carcinogen. Similarly, all mothball deodorizers sold contain
237. Marley Pump Expands Production of World's Only NSF-Certified Water Pump,
PR Newswire, Apr. 26, 1994, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, PRNEWS File.
238. See Pfaff, supra note 205, at 3.
239. For example, under proposition 65 pressure, Gillette reformulated Liquid Paper
by replacing trichloroethylene (TCE), a carcinogen, with trichloroethane (TCA). Stephen
Barlas, Food Industry Tries To Kill Prop 65 in Washington, CPI PURCHASING, Apr. 1990, at
23. Trichloroethane, however, is considered to have short-term health impacts and also to
contribute to depletion of the ozone layer. See James Glanz, CFC Replacements Technolo-
gies: Help Is on the Way, R & D, Dec. 1992, at 28.
240. See also Clifford, supra note 196 (critics argue that reformulation of nail polish,
spurred by Proposition 65, addressed only marginal health risks to consumers from listed
chemical toluene).
241. See supra note 84.
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paradichlorobenzene, a listed carcinogen.242 Without the availability
of alternative products, consumers most likely "filter out [these warn-
ings] from their field of vision.
'243
2. Environmental Exposures
Although the warnings for environmental exposures have been
greatly flawed, the statute appears to have played some role in reduc-
ing toxic air emissions and other environmental exposures in Califor-
nia. Enforcement actions have stimulated some of the most notable
reductions, as prosecuting parties have traded large penalties in ex-
change for emissions cutbacks. One series of lawsuits filed by the At-
torney General's Office led to a forty percent reduction in statewide
air emissions of ethylene oxide, a medical sterilant that is both a car-
cinogen and reproductive toxicant.244 In another enforcement action,
a biotechnology company in Richmond (Contra Costa County) elimi-
nated an estimated 60,000 pounds of chloroform per year after it was
sued by public prosecutors under Proposition 65 and other statutes.
245
An environmental group's enforcement efforts aimed at large lead
emitters in southern California have forced numerous facilities to de-
crease their lead emissions by possibly several thousand pounds.
246
Another lawsuit filed by a local community organization and the At-
torney General in East Oakland led to a ninety-nine percent reduc-
tion in lead emissions by a brass and iron foundry, which previously
242. There are, however, alternative means of protecting clothing from moths, such as
cedar shavings.
243. See Dwyer, supra note 146, at 31. Still, in cases where there are at present no
substitute products, warnings can lead to a more informed public that can create pressure
for alternatives or substitutes. Warnings also allow individuals to minimize or avoid
exposures.
244. See Pease, Chemical Hazards, supra note 25, at 18-19.
245. People v. Bio-Rad Laboratories, Inc., No. C-90-05401 (Contra Costa County
Super. Ct. filed Dec. 12, 1990), summarized in Prop. 65 Litigation, supra note 15, at 13.
246. California Earth Corps. v. Delco Remy, CV-94-2203 (C.D. Cal.) (company that
was emitting 293 pounds of lead per year agreed to install 10 new baghouses with control
efficiencies of 99.99+%); California Earth Corps. v. Thakar Aluminum Corp., No. 254720
(Riverside County Super. Ct. filed Aug. 29, 1994) (recycling facility emitting close to 500
pounds of lead per year will install air knife system to shake out lead weights in recycled
cans, eliminating most emissions); California Earth Corps v. Ramcar Batteries, BC109210
(L.A. County Super. Ct.) (battery manufacturing company that reported emissions of 229
pounds of lead agreed to major reductions); People v. GNB Batteries, Inc., No. BC079211
(L.A. County Super. Ct. filed July 13, 1994) and California Earth Corps v. GNB Batteries,
Inc., No. BC079212 (L.A. County Super. Ct. filed July 13, 1994) (company that reported
lead emissions of 319 pounds and 1039 pounds per year at battery manufacturing and bat-
tery recycling facility agreed to dramatic reductions); California Earth Corps v. Quenell
Enters., No. BC086292 (L.A. County Super. Ct. filed July 1993) (company reduced lead
emissions from a reported 3178 pounds to 109 pounds per year); Interview with Michael
Freund, Counsel for California Earth Corps, Oakland, CA, July 12, 1995.
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emitted over 800 pounds annually.247 There have been other, less dra-
matic instances of reductions triggered by enforcement actions as
well.
2 4 8
Some more general, instructive data about air emissions subject
to Proposition 65 also exist. An early study found that from 1987 to
1989, air emissions of forty-four Proposition 65 chemicals decreased
by two-thirds in California. More than eighty percent of listed chemi-
cals with emissions greater than 10,000 pounds decreased during this
period.249 In the subsequent four years, air emissions of these chemi-
cals have declined an additional sixty-three percent, in some instances
dropping precipitously. 250 Benzene emissions, for example, have de-
clined by an additional sixty-one percent; perchloroethylene by an ad-
ditional fifty-six percent; and ethylene glycol monomethyl ether by
eighty-eight percent.251 Overall, air emissions of these chemicals
dropped by approximately sixty-eight percent from 1987 to 1993.252
While these figures show considerable reductions, it is difficult to
separate the influence of Proposition 65 from two other information
disclosure laws, both of which require industrial facilities to report
publicly their emissions of hazardous chemicals. The first is EPCRA,
which requires certain industrial facilities to report their routine an-
nual releases of 650 hazardous chemicals, including air emissions.
253
The second is California's Air Toxic "Hot Spots" Information and As-
sessment Act of 1987, which requires facilities emitting one of over
450 chemicals at certain levels to prepare health risk assessments ana-
247. See People United for a Better Oakland (PUEBLO) v. American Brass & Iron
Foundry, No. 708543-3 (Alameda County Super Ct. filed Nov. 17, 1992), summarized in
Prop. 65 Litigation, supra note 15, at 29.
248. Systron Donner agreed to phase out its use of methylene chloride and chloroform
after being sued by an environmental group. Elliot Diringer, East Bay Firm to Halt Use of
2 Carcinogens, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 19, 1990, at A30. A laminating aluminum sheet manufac-
turing plant phased out its methylene chloride emissions after being sued. See California
Earth Corps v. Laminating Co. of Am., No. 706725 (Orange County Super. Ct. filed Mar.
10, 1993), summarized in Prop. 65 Litigation, supra note 15, at 30. A lawsuit filed by a low-
income Latino community group in Alviso (Santa Clara County) resulted in a significant
reduction in asbestos exposures to nearby residents. Trucking Companies Reach Settlement
with Neighbors ofAlviso Superfund Site, 4 Cal. Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 25, at 468-69 (Oct.
21, 1994). McDonnell Douglas agreed to reduce its emissions of hexavalent chromium to
settle a lawsuit filed by the Attorney General. Settlement Between McDonnell Douglas,
State Leaves Warnings Issue Undefined, 4 Cal. Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 22, at 404 (Sept. 9,
1994).
249. Pease, Chemical Hazards, supra note 25, at 16-17.
250. U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, Toxics RELEASE INVENTORY (1990-93).
251. Between 1990 and 1993, benzene emissions declined from 314,366 pounds per
year to 123,944 pounds; perchloroethylene emissions dropped from 3.83 million pounds to
1.7 million pounds; and ethylene glycol monomethyl ether emissions dropped from 132,978
pounds to 15,477 pounds. Id.
252. Id.
253. 42 U.S.C. § 11023 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
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lyzing the effects of their emissions on neighboring receptors.254 A
very recent analysis, however, finds that reductions in air emissions of
Proposition 65 listed chemicals from 1987 to 1993 has been greater in
California than in the rest of the country.255 These results provide
strong evidence that Proposition 65 has had a significant independent
impact on decreasing air emissions, although the study does not con-
trol for the effects of California's Hot Spots law or other State regula-
tory requirements.
While liability concerns account for some emissions decreases,
256
two other factors offer a better explanation. One is that disclosure
forces companies to inventory their emissions systematically, some-
times for the first time. The process frequently uncovers areas where
emissions reductions can be made (often at substantial savings to the
companies). As one observer commenting on the EPCRA process
notes: "[p]eople in industry say this all the time-that they didn't real-
ize themselves until they had to get the data that they were producing
so much waste. ' 257 While Proposition 65 requires far less detailed dis-
254. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 44300-44384 (West Supp. 1995). Under the
"Hot Spots" law, if a risk assessment shows that cumulative emissions from a facility pose a
"significant risk" of cancer, as that term is defined by the local air pollution control dis-
tricts, the facility is required to provide notification to affected residents. Most of the dis-
tricts have defined significant risk in the same way as that term is defined under
Proposition 65 (i.e., one excess cancer case per 100,000 persons exposed.) See, e.g., Joanna
M. Miller, Pollutant Warnings Ordered, L.A. TIMES, May 6, 1992, at BI [hereinafter Miller,
Warnings Ordered] (discussing Ventura County notification level). The form of notifica-
tion is also left to the discretion of the local districts. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§ 44362(b) (West Supp. 1995) ("Any notice shall be made in accordance with procedures
specified by the district."). Most districts have required some type of mailed notice or
community meetings. See, e.g., South Coast Companies Required To Notify Public of Can-
cer Risk from Toxic Air Emissions, 23 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 24, at 1560 (Oct. 9, 1992)
("[F]acilities posing a risk of 10 to 1 in a million would have to send notification letters and
conduct public meetings."). The statute's requirements began to take effect at the same
time Proposition 65's warning provision became effective. Both EPCRA and the Hot
Spots Act cover many, but not all, of the same chemicals as Proposition 65. Proposition 65
also covers a broader range of facilities than either of these statutes.
Other laws which impose regulatory requirements on toxic air contaminants also have
contributed to emissions reductions. These include the Tanner Act, CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE §§ 39650-39668 (West 1992 & Supp. 1995), the Clean Air Act § 112, 42
U.S.C. § 7412 (1988 & Supp. V 1993), as well as some regulations imposed by local air
pollution control districts.
255. Telephone Interview with Professor William Pease, Center for Occupational and
Environmental Health, University of California (Aug. 11, 1995).
256. As in the consumer product context, a number of companies subject to enforce-
ment actions have traded emissions reductions for lower penalties. It is unlikely that this
has been a major factor in triggering reductions by other companies (i.e., those not sued),
however, since businesses seeking a hedge against liability can provide warnings that are
obscure and uninformative. Likewise, businesses are unlikely to worry that these obscure
and uninformative warnings will encourage the filing of tort actions. See supra note 221.
257. Myron Levin, Toxic Factory Emissions Top 5 Million Pounds, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 1,
1991, at B3 (quoting Joel Hirschorn); see also Joanna M. Miller, Early Warning of Cancer
Risk From Pollution Found Lagging, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 16, 1993, at B1 [hereinafter Miller,
1996] THE WARNING GAME
closure (and inventorying) than EPCRA or the Hot Spots law, the
statute has prompted industry self-audits and source reduction.258 A
1992 Cal/EPA survey found that fifty-six percent of the businesses
questioned had participated in an audit to determine Proposition 65
compliance; 259 thirty-six percent of the businesses audited said that
they would not have done so absent Proposition 65.260 The survey
further found that eighty-five percent of businesses surveyed reported
that they had taken action to reduce toxic releases or discharges.
261
The director of industrial safety and health for the California Cham-
ber of Commerce recently acknowledged that the statute had raised
awareness in companies about the toxic chemicals that they use and
"push[ed] technology" through companies seeking safer, alternative
chemicals rather than having to provide warnings.
262
The second factor contributing to emissions decreases is public
relations. As in the consumer product arena, there are strong corpo-
rate concerns about negative environmental publicity. As one author
argues, information disclosure laws work because they "rely on corpo-
rate managers' aversion to shame. ' 263 In a highly publicized example
Early Warning] ("Nobody knew what kind of emissions were coming from a lot of this stuff
before this program," quoting Terri Thomas, Supervisor, Ventura County Air Toxics Pro-
gram, regarding impact of Hot Spots statute); Keith Schneider, For Communities, Knowl-
edge of Polluters Is Power, N.Y. TIMES, March 24, 1991, § 4, at 5 ("Industrial executives and
environmental groups agree that the law's most important contribution has been to cause
companies to recognize the extent of their discharges and the effect they may have on
public health."). Cf Jane Suchukoske, The Evolving Paradigm of Laws on Lead-Based
Paint: From Code Violation to Environmental Hazard, 45 S.C. L. REV. 510, 525-26 (1994)
(criticizing traditional housing law regulation of lead-based paint hazards because it has
allowed property owners not to know about the presence of lead hazards on their
property).
258. See Memorandum from Charles M. Shulock, supra note 36, § 1.4; see also Gaston,
supra note 197, at 117 (according to Chevron official, Proposition 65 has caused it to "ver-
ify that our products and plants were very safe and can meet Proposition 65 standards");
Kenneth W. Kizer et al., supra note 23, at 955 (suggesting that industry should perform
environmental audits of its processes that involve Proposition 65 chemicals).
259. Review Panel Survey, supra note 197, at 12.
260. Id. at 15.
261. Id. at 16. Almost two-thirds of these businesses, however, thought that the correc-
tive action was not worthwhile from their perspective. Id. at 20-21 (24% considered taking
the action was "not cost effective" and an additional 40% considered taking the action "a
waste"). See also Smith, supra note 197, at B1 (early indications are that the law is chang-
ing some behavior in California and starting to have a national effect); see Reuben, supra
note 227, at 18 ("Entire industries have moved to improve their products .... ).
262. California's Prop 65: Lessons for the National Risk Debate?, RISK POLICY RE-
PORT, Jan. 20, 1995, at 24 (quoting Robert Reeves, California Chamber of Commerce).
263. See Celia Campbell-Mohn, Objectives and Tools of Environmental Laws, in ENVI-
RONMENTAL LAW: FROM RESOURCES TO RECOVERY § 4.2(1), at 142 (Celia Campbell-
Mohn et al. eds., 1993); John Holusha, Chemical Makers Identify a New Hazard- Their
Image, N.Y. TIMES, Aug 12, 1991, at D7 (chemical industry spending $10 million on adver-
tising and communications campaign to convince people that chemical plants are run by
friendly, responsible people).
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of how public exposure can command the attention of top corporate
managers, Monsanto Corporation agreed to reduce its air emissions
by ninety percent on the eve of the first national release of EPCRA
data-data which revealed that the company emitted over 374 million
pounds of toxic substances annually.264 Numerous other companies
now regularly tout their significant emissions-reduction goals.265 For
similar reasons, some businesses have sought to avoid any Proposition
65 community warnings, however inconspicuous and uninformative,
for fear that they might tarnish the company's image.
If Proposition 65 warnings were made more visible and more in-
formative, the statute could become considerably more effective.
EPCRA is illustrative. EPCRA requires disclosure of more informa-
tion than current Proposition 65 warnings, including names of chemi-
cals, annual levels of emissions, some information characterizing the
type of emissions, and, since 1990, facility source reduction practices,
recycling activities, and projected chemical releases for future years.
266
An equally important factor is that the government's release of
EPCRA data is accompanied by widespread publicity, and the data is
made easily available to the public, to government agencies, and to
the media. EPCRA has had remarkable success in stimulating toxic
emissions reductions. From 1987 to 1993, facilities reported a national
drop of forty-three percent from an initial figure of seven billion
pounds.267 While some of this decrease is attributable to more accu-
rate reporting, changes in the estimation of releases, and more strin-
gent regulation, the largest part reflects reductions triggered by
reporting obligations. 268 Senator Frank Lautenberg recently con-
264. Charles L. Elkins, Toxic Chemicals, the Right Response, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13,
1988, § 3, at 3.
265. See, e.g., CIBA Reduces Emissions by Half in Five Years, PR Newswire, May 24,
1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, PRNEWS File (describing emissions reductions of
CIBA-Geigy Corp.); Merck Honored for Outstanding Environmental Achievement, Busi-
ness Wire, Jan. 26, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, BWIRE File (describing
Merck's emissions reduction program); Randolph B. Smith, A U.S. Report Spurs Commu-
nity Action by Revealing Polluters, WALL ST. J., Jan. 2, 1991, at Al (as a result of toxic
release inventory (TRI) reports, dozens of Fortune 500 companies have announced volun-
tary reductions in toxic releases.
EPCRA data also may have a direct impact on the value of corporations. A provoca-
tive recent analysis suggests that stockholders in firms reporting EPCRA pollution figures
experienced negative returns upon the initial release of the information. These returns
translated into an average loss of $4.1 million in stock value for these firms on the day the
data was first released publicly. James T. Hamilton, Pollution as News: Media and Stock
Market Reactions to the Toxics Release Inventory Data, 28 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 98,
109 (1995).
266. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 11023, 13106 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
267. John H. Cushman, Senate Measure Is a Threat to Efficient Pollution Rule, N.Y.
TiMES, June 28, 1995, at A16.




cluded that "the right-to-know [EPCRA] has probably led to more
voluntary pollution prevention efforts and more environmental
cleanup than any other environmental law. ' 269 EPCRA disclosures
have also been credited with stimulating the passage of stricter envi-
ronmental controls.270
California's Hot Spots law has also produced notable emissions
reductions. This law requires facilities to disclose the names of chemi-
cals emitted, quantities of emissions, as well as the level of risks posed
to surrounding community residents.271 The data is publicly available
through the local air pollution control districts. More significantly, in
some districts facilities creating the highest risks have been required
to notify the public through individualized mailings or by holding pub-
lic meetings. Although no database comparable to EPCRA exists to
assess emissions trends under this program, State air quality regula-
tors regularly report that many facilities have chosen to reduce emis-
sions voluntarily rather than conduct risk assessments and provide
community notifications.272
The current Proposition 65 environmental warnings have very lit-
tle informational content regarding chemicals involved, emissions
levels, exposures, or risk levels, and have been largely imperceptible.
Improving the content and visibility of these warnings would stimulate
greater public interest, generate more pressure for toxics reductions,
and empower citizen groups in their dealings with industry and gov-
ernment, as EPCRA and the Hot Spots law have both done. As dis-
cussed below, one method of accomplishing this would be to require
businesses to specify the areas in which they are exposing individuals
above the statutory thresholds and the levels of risk associated with
those exposures.273
269. 141 CONG. REc. S9880, 9886 (daily ed. July 13, 1995). In 1991, the Natural Re-
sources Defense Council likewise opined that reports filed under EPCRA have done more
to reduce toxic air emissions than twenty years of the Clean Air Act's regulatory program.
John Holusha, The Nation's Polluters-Who Emits What, and Where, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13,
1991, § 3, at 10.
Even companies subject to regulation have endorsed the statute. The vice president
for regulatory affairs at the Chemical Manufacturers Association recently called it a "very
successful venture," noting that "[o]ur members have gotten behind it and witnessed a 50
percent reduction in pollution." Cushman, supra note 267, at Al. These companies have
nonetheless been lobbying for legislation to restrict the scope of EPCRA. See id.
270. Smith, supra note 265, at Al (EPCRA reports lead to adoption of comprehensive
air pollution statute in Louisiana and toxics-use reduction law in Massachusetts).
271. See supra note 254.
272. See Miller, Early Warning, supra note 257, at B1.




In some respects, Proposition 65 has the greatest potential for
toxics reductions in the workplace. Employee exposures to toxic
chemicals are typically far higher than consumer or environmental ex-
posures. In its comparative risk project, U.S. EPA ranked occupa-
tional exposures as among the risks deserving greatest regulatory
attention.2 74 Nonetheless, workplace exposure limits have not been
set at sufficiently stringent levels. 275 Moreover, government enforce-
ment of occupational health standards has often been less aggressive
than enforcement of more general environmental requirements.
276
Furthermore, workers do not have recourse to the types of citizen suit
provisions available under other environmental statutes.
It has not been easy, however, to implement Proposition 65 in the
workplace on top of an existing notification standard. Proposition 65
seems to have done little beyond what the current Hazard Communi-
cation Standard has already accomplished. Only a handful of lawsuits
has been filed to enforce the warning requirement.277 In one case, a
rubber stamp manufacturer agreed to hire a consultant to review
training and warning programs dealing with hazardous chemicals and
to implement the consultant's recommendations after being sued for
failure to provide warnings regarding toluene to its workers.2 78 An-
other lawsuit led to additional information being included on a MSDS
for automotive coating products.2 79 Few other manifest changes in
workplace conditions have been reported.
274. EPA SCIENCE ADVISORY BOARD, REDUCING RISK (1990). Some studies suggest
that approximately 50,000-70,000 deaths per year may be occurring as a result of toxic
exposures in the workplace. See Finkel, supra note 147, at 307 n.60 (1994) (citing studies);
Kizer et al., supra note 23, at 955 (workplace exposures under Proposition 65 will be con-
siderably higher than other exposures).
275. William S. Pease et al., supra note 25, at 262-65 (occupational safety and health
laws allow exposure of workers to chemicals at several orders of magnitude above Proposi-
tion 65 standards).
276. See Thomas 0. McGarity & Sidney A. Shapiro, Reorienting OSHA: Regulatory
Alternatives and Legislative Reform, 6 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 46 (1989) (arguing that Congress
has helped EPA fulfill its mandate, while largely ignoring OSHA). The average fine im-
posed by OSHA for claims involving death or serious injury in 1990 was only $890. More-
over, because settlement agreements often exchange a reduction in fines for abatement,
OSHA collects less than half of the fines levied. MCGARITY & SHAPIRO, supra note 68, at
217. See also Ralph Nader, Occupational Safety and Health Act, Address at New Chal-
lenges in Occupational Health Symposium (Mar. 4, 1994), in 31 Hous. L. REV. 1, 2-9 (ar-
guing that "we as a society do not take occupational health and safety seriously").
277. Jordan, supra note 15, at 29. This is likely to increase, since until recently there
was significant legal uncertainty as to whether Proposition 65's warning requirements were
preempted by federal law. See supra note 29.
278. Gonzales v. Sam's Group, Inc., No. 714908-3 (Alameda County Super. Ct. filed
Apr. 17, 1993), summarized in Prop. 65 Litigation, supra note 15, at 31.
279. Automobile Paint Manufacturers Agree To Remove Lead, Chromium and Cad-
mium, PROP 65 NEws, Mar. 1995, at 1, 12.
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Improved warnings, however, should make workers more knowl-
edgeable about hazards not covered under the current Hazard Com-
munication Standard, and could contribute to the reduction of
workplace hazards. Information can stimulate workplace improve-
ments through both "exit" and "voice" strategies. Workers who per-
ceive greater job risks may demand and receive higher wages for risky
occupations.28 0 These workers can also alter their willingness to enter
into hazardous employment and seek better working conditions else-
where. This "exit" strategy generates pressure on employers to re-
duce workplace risks.28' Workers may also adopt a "voice" strategy in
response to information about hazardous exposures, responding with
more open expressions of job dissatisfaction, absenteeism, discharges
for cause, and both authorized and unauthorized strikes.
282
D. Has Proposition 65 Promoted Overwarning?
283
Critics of Proposition 65 argued that the statute would lead to a
proliferation of warnings. "We won't know what products are really
dangerous anymore," they wrote in the ballot argument; "The warn-
ings we really need will get lost in lots of warnings we don't need."284
Some commentators contend that these predictions have been real-
ized and that Proposition 65 warnings have mushroomed, to the detri-
ment of the public. 285
280. Viscusi & O'Connor, supra note 48, at 99-104; see also MENDELOFF, supra note 45,
at 44, 46 (weight of evidence of labor studies is that risk premiums are paid to workers in
more hazardous jobs). But see MCGARITY & SHAPIRO, supra note 68, at 18-20 (question-
ing whether wage premiums occur).
281. W. Kip Viscusi, RISK BY CHOICE: REGULATING HEALTH AND SAFETY IN THE
WORKPLACE 157, 167 (1983); see also Mendeloff, supra note 45, at 212 (information can
facilitate relatively efficient risk-reduction measures through voluntary bargaining and gen-
erate market pressure on employers to reduce risks because new risk perceptions alter
attractiveness of certain jobs).
282. James C. Robinson, Worker Responses to Workplace Hazards, 12 J. HEALTH POL.
POL'Y & L. 665, 668, 676 (1987). These responses may lead to improved health and safety
conditions, but not without significant social costs. Id. at 676. But see supra notes 67-71
and accompanying text for a discussion of reasons why workers may be unable to demand
or effect a reduction in workplace hazards even with additional information.
283. For purposes of this discussion, "overwarning" refers to the practice of providing
warnings which are not required under the statute.
284. See REBUTIAL TO ARGUMENT IN FAVOR OF PROPOSITION 65, in BALLOT PAM-
PHLET, supra note 6, at 54. They also predicted that owners of manufacturing processes
and products might choose to create a "protective blanket of warnings" in order to avoid
any prosecution under the statute. SENATE OFFICE OF RESEARCH, REPORT TO THE STATE
SENATE OF 1986, ANALYSIS OF PROPOSITION 65, SAFE DRINKING WATER AND Toxic EN-
FORCEMENT ACT, at 9 (1986).
285. Peter H. Weiner, Enforcement of Proposition 65: Unclear and Unreasonable?,
PROP 65 NEws, Feb. 1992, at 8 (Proposition 65 has not accomplished its loftier goals of
increasing public awareness of risks and changing market and political behavior in part
because too many warnings are given).
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To persons living in California, it may seem that Proposition 65
warnings are ubiquitous and that warning fatigue is inevitable. In fact,
many of the most frequently encountered warnings are for very few
products-in particular, warnings about alcoholic beverages in retail
stores, bars, and restaurants where liquor is sold; warnings about sec-
ond-hand smoke in bars, restaurants, commercial buildings, and other
public facilities; and warnings about gasoline at gas stations. 286 Con-
sumers will likely start to tune out these continual warnings.287 Re-
search suggests that consumer attention to individual warnings
generally diminishes over time and that consumers are less likely to
respond to messages that simply reinforce their existing knowledge
rather than provide them with new information. 288 This consumer
tendency led the federal government to require cigarette manufactur-
ers to periodically rotate the warnings on their packages. 289 While di-
minishing public attention to repeated warnings has important public
policy implications (suggesting the need to vary warnings or raising
long-term questions about the utility of warnings in certain instances),
it does not necessarily mean that the multitude of warnings desensi-
tizes consumers to warnings in general. 290
There is no question, however, that many businesses have chosen
to warn "protectively" by providing warnings when not required to do
so. To some extent, this is a natural reaction by businesses to avoid
liability, particularly when a business bears the responsibility for de-
termining whether to warn.291 After all, there is no legal sanction for
286. See Christine Russell, California Is Getting Tough on Toxics, WASH. POSr, May 23,
1989, at Z12, Z14 (Proposition 65 warnings "are present, but [they are] far from ubiqui-
tous."). Another source of warning "clutter" in California is the multitude of signs in small
grocery and convenience stores left over from the 800-number "warning" system that was
invalidated in 1989. See Maker of Liquid Paper Agrees To Remove Carcinogen, Pay Fine,
S.D. UNION-TRIB., Sept. 29, 1989, at A4.
287. See Dwyer, supra note 146, at 31 (consumers filter out warnings from their field of
vision that are not essential but culturally ingrained, such as warnings regarding the use of
alcohol).
288. See Wogalter, supra note 85, at 7 (upon seeing a warning over time, it will attract
less and less attention).
289. Stewart & Martin, supra note 66, at 6; see also Hadden, Regulating Product Risks,
supra note 8, at 98.
290. Consumers may also become desensitized to individual warnings because no im-
mediate consequences appear to follow from failure to heed repeated warnings-such as
from smoking cigarettes-even though a long-term health risk is present. See Stewart &
Martin, supra note 66, at 7.
291. See Weiner, supra note 284, at 8, 10-13 (overwarning results because of legal un-
certainty over the meaning of the term "knowingly" and because of difficulties businesses
encounter in determining whether exposures exceed the "no significant risk level"); Ste-
vens, supra note 82, at 125-26 (companies may warn regardless of the amount present in
order to avoid liability or avoid having to test for presence of chemicals or whether expo-
sure poses significant risk). This type of conservative approach undoubtedly motivates
protective warning in other contexts by businesses concerned about tort liability. See Vis-
cusi, supra note 7, at 155-56. Some evidence also suggests that industry trade associations
[Vol. 23:303
THE WARNING GAME
providing unnecessary warnings. On the other hand, protective warn-
ings have multiplied only in contexts where the warnings have no seri-
ous cost to businesses, such as where there are no available product
substitutes, or more significantly, where the warnings provided are so
vague and uninformative as to have little meaning to individuals. For
example, there are probably thousands of generic warnings about un-
specified chemicals located in commercial office buildings or at the
entrances to industrial facilities. Usually, these warnings simply state
that the "building" or "facility" may contain a chemical known to the
State to cause cancer. While some warnings are in visible locations,
many are not.292 The signs are routinely ignored (as they were likely
designed to be) but they may help reduce a company's future liabil-
ity.293 By contrast, anecdotal evidence indicates that businesses have
provided very few warnings on consumer or food products294 where
they perceive any type of hazard warning as creating a serious
drawback. 295
OEHHA has correctly concluded that the proliferation of unnec-
essary Proposition 65 warnings is largely due to flaws in the current
warning regulations:
The "safe harbor" warnings may convey that a product or an area
"contain" a listed chemical ... without any further indication that an
exposure may be occurring .... Some persons apparently prefer to
issue warnings than to go to the trouble of ascertaining whether one is
required. By allowing warnings which advise of the presence of, but
not exposure to, a chemical, the existing regulation encourages this
have counseled their members to provide a warning on any product containing even trace
amounts of a listed chemical, regardless of whether it actually poses a significant risk. See
Roberts, supra note 6, at 308. Some observers contend that this has been done deliberately
to undermine Proposition 65. Id.
292. As discussed, supra note 157, there is no standard format for warnings for envi-
ronmental exposures.
293. See Akst, supra note 197, at D1, D5 ("Largely useless warnings of toxicity within
now appear on some office buildings, hotels, pharmacies, and gas stations, no doubt con-
tributing to public cynicism about risk.").
Other pervasive warnings are the ones inserted quarterly into the bills received by
customers of major utility companies, such as Pacific Gas & Electric (PG&E) and San
Diego Gas and Electric (SDG&E). The PG&E warning is written in very small print and
is technical, legalistic, and dense. It largely describes the general operations of the utility
that use listed chemicals or whose combustion processes may generate listed chemicals as
byproducts. It refers once to household applications, stating that "[ulse of natural gas in
home or commercial appliances can also produce these combustion by-products." It does
not mention exposures occurring from any PG&E activities.
294. Interview with Weil, supra note 227; Telephone Interview with Catherine Cara-
way, supra note 97; see also Memorandum from Charles M. Shulock, supra note 36,
§ V.C.1 (in 1992 review, Cal/EPA found that no warnings had been provided for reproduc-
tive toxicants in food products).
295. See Stevens, supra note 82, at 124 (industries producing items that consumers will
be less willing to buy if they have an associated warning, such as food items, tend not to
overwarn).
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practice. The result is a proliferation of warnings.... [t]hese so-called
"warnings" do a disservice to the public and undermine the effective-
ness of the Act.
296
Amending the regulations to insure that warnings are provided only
where a significant risk exists would reduce the current number of
warnings. 29
7
Two additional points about the overwarning argument should be
considered. First, Proposition 65 warnings obviously represent only a
small fraction of societal warnings. One author estimates that sixty-
five percent of all goods and services now bear some kind of disclo-
sure of negative effects or potentially negative effects.2 98 Second, little
hard evidence exists to prove that increased societal warnings have
actually resulted in consumer desensitization to warnings.299 In a re-
cent comprehensive review of the literature on the effects of product
warnings, marketing professors David Stewart and Ingrid Martin con-
clude that there is very little empirical evidence as to whether the
ubiquity of warnings diminishes consumer attention to warning
messages. 300 Thus, while the overwarning problem is not insubstantial,
and eliminating unnecessary Proposition 65 warnings is certainly de-
sirable, broad claims about the harms resulting from too many statu-
tory warnings cannot be proven.
296. Initial Statement, supra note 119, at 2-3. See recommendations infra part IV.B.
297. This was recommended by the Proposition 65 review panel. Memorandum from
Charles M. Shulock, supra note 36, at § 11.2. See also Stevens, supra note 82, at 124-25
(problem of overwarning can be reduced by limiting number of warnings that people see,
so that warnings are more noticeable, or by requiring more information in warnings).
298. Oldenburg, supra note 103, at B5; see also Clark & Brock, supra note 103, at 298
("The dollar value of products with warnings far exceeds the dollar value of products that
are sold without warnings. We live in an era of warnings .... "). As one analysis recently
noted, warnings are provided for alcoholic beverages, cigarettes, saccharin, tampons, over-
the-counter medications, cleaning products, cosmetics and other personal care products,
lawn mowers, automobiles, microwave ovens, power tools, and electrical appliances, as
well as various service products, ranging from prospectuses for investment products to
rides in amusement parks. Stewart & Martin, supra note 66, at 1.
299. Observers claim that the presence of too many warnings diminishes the attention
paid to all warnings and reduces their overall effectiveness. See Stevens, supra note 82, at
124 (overwarning may cause consumers to ignore warnings, overrate risks associated with
specific items, or conceal worse hazards); Michael Decourcy Hinds, As Warning Labels
Multiply, Messages Are Often Ignored, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 5, 1988, at Al ("People are bom-
barded with an enormous number of warnings every day .... [s]o people just ignore the
warnings and do what they want") (quoting sociologist Amitai Etzioni); Philip H. Abel-
son, California's Proposition 65, 237 SCIENCE 1553 (1987) ("[We have] a nation on worry
overload. One reaction is free-floating anxiety. Another is defensive indifference. If
everything causes cancer, why stop smoking, wear seat belts, or do something about radon
in the home .. . .") (quoting comments of Milton Russell, former Assistant Administrator,
U.S. EPA Office of Policy Planning and Evaluation).
300. Stewart & Martin, supra note 66, at 7, 11.
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IV
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVED PROPOSITION 65
WARNINGS
As the above discussion illustrates, the current Proposition 65
warnings are flawed in key respects. They are frequently inconspicu-
ous and fail to inform recipients of their exposure to listed chemicals
or to communicate effectively the level of risks involved. Their vague
language has contributed to overwarning. Improved warnings are
needed to realize the ambitious underlying objectives of the statute.
A. Prior Efforts To Amend Regulations
Problems in Proposition 65 warning regulations have been appar-
ent since they were first promulgated. Early on, public prosecutors
required as part of settlement agreements that businesses provide
warnings better than those required by the regulations. For example,
settlements provided that consumer product warnings contain sym-
bols,301 that manufacturers state that using the product will expose
consumers to a listed chemical,3°2 and that environmental warnings
contain a map of the affected area or be mailed to affected
residents.303
In late 1990, the HWA began drafting revisions to the warning
regulations, an effort continued by the OEHHA when it assumed re-
sponsibility for implementing Proposition 65 the next year. OEHHA
directed its efforts at what it perceived to be the major flaws in the
regulations: the failure of warnings to include exposure language and
to identify the chemicals causing exposures; the widespread inclusion
of disclaimers and other misleading information in warnings; and the
large number of unnecessary warnings. In 1992, an outside panel con-
vened by Cal/EPA to review the first five years of Proposition 65's
301. Major manufacturers of ceramic tableware agreed to provide warnings including a
small yellow triangle. See Prop 65 Litigation, supra note 15, at 15.
302. E.g., People v. Amvac Corp., No. BC918081 (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. filed
Dec. 13, 1990) ("no pest" strips), summarized in Prop. 65 Litigation, supra note 15, at 11;
People v. Baccarat, Inc., No. 932292 (San Francisco Super. Ct. filed May 16, 1991) (crystal
decanters), summarized in Prop. 65 Litigation, supra note 15, at 12.
303. See Prop. 65 Litigation, supra note 15, at 7, 8, 14 (describing settlements in People
v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., No. BC006061 (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. filed July 18,
1990), People v. Sterilization Services & Vacydyne, No. 630728 (Orange County Super. Ct.
filed July 18, 1990); and People v. Signet-Armorlite, No. 641085 (San Diego County Super.
Ct. filed Aug. 8, 1991), requiring newspaper warnings containing a map of the affected
area); id. at 6-7, 17, 19 (describing settlements in People v. Griffith Micro Science, No.
BC006063 (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. filed July 18, 1990); People v. Hickory Springs,
No. BC057005 (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. filed June 8, 1992); and People v.
Quemetco, Inc., No. BC080112 (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. filed Apr. 30, 1992), re-
quiring provision of mailed warnings).
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performance lent support to OEHHA's efforts, concluding that a need
existed for better warnings. 304
From 1991 to 1993, OEHHA circulated numerous proposals and
convened extensive public hearings to discuss them. Regulated busi-
nesses lobbied intensely to derail the proposals, objecting to require-
ments that they meet minimum criteria in warnings, such as stating
that a product will expose users to a listed chemical. Businesses also
protested provisions requiring them to more carefully analyze poten-
tial exposures and provide more specific information in warnings.30 5
Businesses opposed these reforms because the current regulations of-
fer them far greater leeway to lessen the impact of warnings by pro-
viding vague and uninformative warnings, while also providing
substantial protection from liability in enforcement actions. Ulti-
mately, Governor Wilson refused to support OEHHA in the face of
this stiff political opposition, and OEHHA was forced to abandon its
reform efforts. 30 6
B. Specific Recommendations
Given the inherent limitations of information disclosure laws, not
all of the problems with existing Proposition 65 warnings can be reme-
died with better warnings. In addition, it is not feasible to incorporate
all of the desirable attributes of risk communication programs. Some
inherent tensions exist among the different statutory goals of Proposi-
tion 65. For example, the goal of providing complete risk information
may conflict with the objective of promoting reformulation. An
overly simple warning that stigmatizes products may alarm consumers
and prompt a quicker response by industry.30 7 Likewise, an explicit
warning message may have a higher likelihood of being read and un-
304. Memorandum from Charles M Shulock, supra note 36, at § 11.2. The Attorney
General's Office also advocated more specific warning regulations. Letter from Theodora
P. Berger, Assistant Attorney General, to George Dunn, Deputy Chief of Staff, Gover-
nor's Office, at 1 (Nov. 12, 1992) (on file with author). According to the Attorney General,
these changes would improve compliance with the law, make enforcement easier and more
certain, and reduce exposures to listed chemicals. Id.
305. See Industry Comments on New "Clear and Reasonable Warnings" Regulations,
PROP 65 NEWS, Apr. 1993, at 3 (excerpting comments of industry on proposed regulations
submitted to OEHHA); John Hunter, New Warnings Regs: What Business Should Expect,
PROP 65 NEWS, July-Aug. 1993, at 3.
306. No formal announcement withdrawing the regulations was made, but it is clear
that the proposals were shelved because of industry opposition. See Strock Suggests Pro-
posed New Warning Regulations in Jeopardy, PROP 65 NEWS, June 1993, at 3 (Cal/EPA
Secretary James Strock expresses doubt about status of amendments to warning regula-
tions, pointing to "flood of opposition from the business community").
307. See HADDEN, supra note 7, at 243, 255-56 n.8 (arguing that requiring specific and
strong labels may cause manufacturers to substitute less hazardous ingredients rather than
provide warnings, and citing evidence to this effect resulting from a voluntary warning
program for art supplies).
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derstood,308 albeit at the expense of omitting information about the
uncertainties of risk assessment. While brief warnings may not in-
clude all the necessary risk information, lengthier warnings may not
be read by consumers who are already overloaded with information.
Likewise, while as a normative matter it would be desirable for
Proposition 65 warnings to provide comparisons with other products
or activities, 30 9 this is probably impractical to actually implement. Ob-
taining data about products or activities that are related closely
enough in their qualitative characteristics or are sufficiently familiar to
recipients to be meaningful baselines for comparison would be ex-
tremely difficult, especially for risks from environmental exposures
and reproductive toxicants.310 Moreover, short of the State dictating
the content of the comparisons (for which insufficient relevant data
exists in any case), there is the significant danger that businesses will
manipulate comparisons to bias recipients so that they will accept
whatever risk is being disclosed in the warning.311 This has already
occurred to some extent under Proposition 65.312
A final concern with requiring additional information on con-
sumer product warnings is whether additional information can fit on
product labels, which are frequently crowded. Research suggests,
however, that various ways exist to increase the size of a product la-
bel, affording greater surface area upon which to print information.
313
308. See Nordenstam & DiMento, supra note 35, at 361.
309. These can promote more informed choices and increase understanding of unfamil-
iar risks. Bettman et al., supra note 49, at 16-17; Covello, supra note 130, at 1445, 1449;
NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, supra note 53, at 96-98, 172-74; Stenzel, supra note 53,
at 524-25.
310. Even then, the risks may not truly be comparable. See Ellen K. Silbergeld, The
Risks of Comparing Risks, 3 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 405, 408-10 (1995) (stating that different
populations are at risk from different activities; the risk of most diseases varies by age
category; risk comparisons overlook the fact that multiple environmental and genetic fac-
tors may interact to cause disease; there are limitations in our ability to quantify noncancer
human health risks). For a discussion of how qualitative characteristics of risks affect risk
perception, see supra notes 121-28 and accompanying text.
311. See Baruch Fischhoff, Understanding Long-Term Environmental Risks, 3 J. RISK
& UNCERTAINTY 315, 322 n.ll (1990) (little can be inferred from risk comparisons when
actions being compared are different in various risks, benefits, and control options);
Covello, supra note 130, at 1446-48 (risk comparisons may fail to incorporate the qualita-
tive dimensions that underlie people's concerns about the acceptability of risk); NATIONAL
ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, supra note 53, at 97, 172 (different qualitative characteristics af-
fect the way comparisons are viewed; comparisons can be distorted by selecting as a basis
for comparison seemingly trivial risks or risks that the public is known to subjectively
underestimate).
312. See supra notes 139-41 and 174-75 and accompanying text.
313. See Michael S. Wogalter & Stephen L. Young, The Effect of Alternative Product-
Label Design on Warning Compliance, 25 APPLIED ERGONOMICS 53, 57 (1994).
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Warnings can also be posted on shelf signs, alongside price, quality,
and nutritional information.
314
Notwithstanding these various limitations, Proposition 65's warn-
ing regulations could be strengthened in ways that would substantially
advance the various goals of the statute without unduly sacrificing
others. The following eight specific recommendations can be feasibly
implemented and will generate warnings that better achieve the Prop-
osition's overall objectives.
1. Warnings should contain design features that emphasize
noticeability and readability
Most individuals face a welter of stimuli in everyday life. Warn-
ings that do not stand out from the background will not be noticed,
particularly by people with no prior interest in the subject.3 15 Thus,
warnings should be designed to attract attention. As one expert ex-
pressed, "[w]arnings [should] be as dynamic as advertising."
316
A symbol or icon can significantly help attract attention to a
warning.317 Symbols can also be very helpful in elucidating a warning,
and can be especially useful for reaching people with limited literacy
and language skills.3 18 Although no established symbol exists to indi-
cate hazards of cancer or reproductive harm, other currently recogniz-
able symbols or design shapes, such as triangles, can be used to arouse
attention.31 9 Therefore, OEHHA should develop a symbol or icon
that helps convey the warning message underlying Proposition 65.
Warnings should have color print or colored symbols that con-
trast with their background, because colors more effectively arouse
attention.320 Warnings should be printed in a print size larger than
314. See Viscusi, supra note 124, at 298-99 (prominent point of purchase display can be
more effective than a nonprominent product label). A less desirable alternative would be
to include an abbreviated warning on a product label that refers to more detailed informa-
tion elsewhere, such as in a package insert or in-store compendium.
315. NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, supra note 53, at 136 (people most likely to
receive messages are those who already possess some information about the issues under
question; "[tihe people who need information most seem to be the least likely to pay
attention.").
316. Oldenburg, supra note 103, at B5 (quoting Timothy Brock, psychologist specializ-
ing in communications).
317. See Bettman et al., supra note 49, at 15; Wogalter, supra note 85, at 8.
318. Wogalter, supra note 85, at 8.
319. The American National Standard Institute (ANSI) recommends that triangles be
used to convey hazard alert messages on safety signs. See AMERICAN NATIONAL STAN-
DARD INsTrruTE, CRITERIA FOR SAFETY SYMBoLs 2 (ANSI Z535.3-1991); see also HAD-
DEN, supra note 7, at 233-34 (inverted triangles used to convey caution under Canadian
government's hazard labeling system).
320. Bettman et al., supra note 49, at 15; Wogalter, supra note 85, at 5.
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that immediately surrounding them.321 Also, the regulations should
contain more specific guidance about the placement of warnings to
insure that they are noticeable. 322
2. Businesses should be required to provide mailed notices when
warning exposed individuals about offsite environmental
exposures
Mailed notices are far more likely to be seen and read than news-
paper ads, since a small percentage of the population reads newspa-
pers and an even smaller percentage reads advertisements.
Proposition 65 warning regulations should be modified to require at
least two of the required quarterly warnings for offsite environmental
exposures be mailings to affected individuals.
323
3. Warnings should inform recipients of their exposure to listed
chemicals
Proposition 65's current regulations allow businesses to provide
vague and uninformative warnings. To better fulfill the underlying
statutory purposes, warnings should expressly state that persons are
exposed to listed chemicals, not merely that consumer products, work-
places, or facilities contain such chemicals. 324 For example, OEHHA
proposed the following consumer product warning: "WARNING:
Use of this product will expose you to a chemical known to cause
cancer [birth defects or other reproductive harm].
325
321. For an example of a recent California statute mandating some of these elements,
see the asbestos notification provision enacted in 1994, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§ 25916 (West 1992 & Supp. 1996) (requiring that printed warnings appear "in print which
is readily visible because of its large size and bright color.")
322. Thus, for example, the regulations should specify that warnings on consumer
product labels must be prominently displayed on the package, either in the front of the box
or in another location likely to be examined by the shopper before purchase. See Viscusi,
supra note 124, at 299. Likewise, OEHHA should follow its earlier proposal that newspa-
per warnings must appear in the main news section or local news section of daily newspa-
pers, and be approximately 1/4 page in size. See Office of Environmental Health Hazard
Assessment, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Amendment to Section 12601, Aug. 25, 1992,
§ 12605(b)(3) [hereinafter 1992 NPRM].
323. The current regulatory guidance suggests that cost is a relevant factor in determin-
ing whether mailings or newspaper notices are an appropriate form of warning for commu-
nity exposures. This has the perverse effect of allowing facilities whose emissions have the
greatest geographic impact to use the least effective form of warning.
Another possibility would be to require that mailings and newspaper warnings be used
in combination; letters would be mailed to the households closest to the facilities, and
newspaper notices would be used to warn populations farther away. See Wheaton & Jor-
dan, supra note 161, at 12.
324. The current safe harbor warning language states, "This product [area] contains a
chemical known to cause cancer [reproductive toxicity]." CAL. CODE REGS., tit. 26, §§ 22-
12601(b)(4), (c)(3) (1995).
325. This language was proposed by OEHHA. See 1992 NPRM, supra note 322,
§ 12603(e)(2).
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The above warning "more accurately reflect[s] the Act's require-
ment that warnings be provided when exposures are known to occur,"
and "also makes the warning personally significant to its recipient. ' 326
Occupational warnings and warnings on facility signs should likewise
state that the relevant activity "will expose" the warning recipient to
the harmful chemical.327
Warnings for offsite exposures must alert recipients to the specific
area in which the exposures occur, giving the message personal rele-
vance to the reader. OEHHA should adopt its proposal that warnings
present the approximate geographic boundaries of the area in which
the exposure occurs in terms familiar to the community. This could be
done, for example, by using isopleths (maps with superimposed lines
highlighting the affected area).
328
4. Warnings should disclose the name of any listed chemical(s)
triggering the warning requirement329
This requirement promotes more fully informed decisionmaking
and should be viewed as a necessary component of what individuals
are entitled to know.
5. Warnings should disclose information about the approximate
level of risk to which individuals are exposed330
Modifying the "one-size-fits-all" format of current warnings
would have several benefits. First, it would allow individuals to better
assess the particular risks posed by a business or product. Second, it
would force businesses to determine the actual level of risk to which
they are exposing individuals, thus reducing the number of unneces-
sary or protective warnings.331 This change would also allow the mar-
ket to function more efficiently, since products containing the same
listed chemicals may pose risks that vary considerably. For example,
while until very recently all new brass kitchen faucets contained lead,
they caused exposures ranging from an estimated 2.76 micrograms per
326. Initial Statement, supra note 119, at 4.
327. These changes were also recommended by OEHHA, which additionally proposed
similar language in a newly-created warning for new homes. Id at 27, 31, 23.
328. Id. at 10-11, 32.
329. This also was proposed by OEHHA. See id. at 8. OEHHA also suggested that
where there are multiple chemicals causing exposures above the warning level, only the 2
or 3 causing the highest exposures would have to be identified. Id.
330. OEHHA's draft proposals permitted, but did not require, warnings to describe
the level of hazard posed by exposure to the product.
331. According to OEHHA's recommendations, this "would compel most businesses
to thoroughly evaluate whether exposures which require a warning are in fact occurring
prior to issuing a warning .... This encourages analysis, rather than indiscriminate warn-
ing." Initial Statement, supra note 119, at 4. Companies are also more likely to warn
unnecessarily if they can use vague language in their warnings.
[Vol. 23:303
THE WARNING GAME
day (five times the Proposition 65 warning threshold) to 124 micro-
grams per day (250 times the level). 332 Consumer choice can be frus-
trated by a warning that does not describe these disparate risk levels.
The benefits from mandating disclosure of risk levels are considerable,
and outweigh the additional costs that may be incurred by businesses
in calculating the risks posed by their products. 333
However, crafting a warning that meaningfully informs recipients
about risk levels is very difficult.334 Most people are poor evaluators
of probabilistic information, and have difficulty understanding ex-
tremely small or extremely large magnitudes. 335 Thus, providing only
the bare numerical risk levels, such as telling people that a consumer
product poses a cancer risk of 3.5 X 10-7, will not be very helpful.336 A
better format would be to have the warnings express the risks posed
by an exposure both in these absolute numerical terms (at least for
carcinogens), and through comparisons with the risk levels that trigger
warnings under the statute.
337
Warnings for carcinogens should provide the approximate risk
level posed by a consumer, occupational, or environmental exposure.
Environmental warnings about industrial emissions should have iso-
pleths or other graphic representations to help demonstrate the vary-
ing risk levels faced by individuals. The warnings also should indicate
how the risks compare to the warning threshold. Thus, for an occupa-
tional exposure posing a 5.3 X 10. cancer risk, the warning should
state that the risk of cancer is approximately five times the level at
which Proposition 65 requires warnings to be provided.
332. Richard C. Paddock, Faucets Pose Lead Hazard, Suits Charge, L.A. TIMES, Dec.
16, 1992, at Al, Al & A28 (citing study by Dr. Richard Maas, Environmental Quality
Institute).
333. In most cases, however, these additional costs should not be substantial. Busi-
nesses are required by other statutes to perform risk assessments for some exposures cov-
ered by Proposition 65; the California "Hot Spots" law, for example, requires this for
certain industrial air emissions. See supra note 254. Other laws require businesses to cal-
culate exposure levels to Proposition 65 chemicals, data which can be used to help deter-
mine risk levels posed by exposures. This information is required, for instance, by OSHA's
workplace exposure standards. See CAL. CODE REGS tit. 8, § 5155(c).
334. NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, supra note 53, at 1, 25 ("[P]resenting clear
and understandable information is a tremendous challenge for message designers.").
335. Id. at 131; Bettman et al., supra note 49, at 25; BREYER, supra note 125, at 36; W.
Kip Viscusi, Do Smokers Underestimate Risks?, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1253, 1257-60 (1990).
336. NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, supra note 53, at 131, 167 ("Few people can
meaningfully distinguish among small probabilities and may have no way of determining if
such an assessment as "1-in-10,000 lifetime risk" is worth worrying about"); see also Hugh
Crone, Editorial: Dose, Content, Risk: Can We Instruct the Public?, 8 REG. TOXICOLOGY &
PHARMACOLOGY 1-3 (1988) (arguing that the public has difficulty in appreciating orders of
magnitude: "A part per billion sounds very much like a part per million.").
337. Baruch Fischhoff, Risk: A Guide to Controversy, in NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCI-
ENCES, supra note 53, at 211, 304 (risk may seem much worse when described in relative
rather than absolute terms; the best approach is to present risk from both perspectives).
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Warnings for reproductive risks should state the risk level by ref-
erence to threshold levels (which are not expressed as probabilities of
contracting disease), i.e., the warning should state that the risk of re-
productive toxicity is five times the level at which a warning is
required.
6. Warnings should alert recipients to the fact that risk assessment is
an uncertain process338
Conveying this message in a succinct and neutral way is extraor-
dinarily difficult. 339 Perhaps the best approach would be to include
language stating that "Due to the uncertainties involved in risk assess-
ment, the risks may be somewhat greater or lower than those cited,"
and make a more detailed explanation of the risk assessment process
available to interested persons.340 This is hardly ideal, but the alterna-
tive of providing lengthier risk assessment information on every warn-
ing-particularly for consumer products-is unworkable.
7 Warnings should contain standard warning language with
limitations on additional statements
The track record of loosely regulated warnings, particularly envi-
ronmental warnings, demonstrates that limiting the content of warn-
ings is essential to avoid inferior warnings. Moreover, comprehension
of warnings is too sensitive to changes in warning content or form to
allow businesses to create variability. The inclusion of disclaimers,
lengthy "filler" material, or self-serving statements often distort or un-
dermine the warning message. 341
The manner in which risks are expressed or framed also can have
a major impact on how they are perceived.342 For example, an activity
that increases the risk of death from 1 in 10,000 to 1.3 in 10,000 would
probably be viewed as much more risky if it were described as result-
ing in a thirty percent increase in mortality risk.343
338. See Stenzel, supra note 53, at 523-25 (arguing that warnings should describe the
uncertain nature of the numbers presented and information about assumptions used in the
risk assessment).
339. See NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, supra note 53, at 129 (technical terminol-
ogy of risk assessment is very difficult to understand).
340. See id. at 159-60 (recommending that risk communicators prepare supporting
technical documents that summarize relevant quantitative and qualitative information,
data gaps, uncertainty about risk, and assumptions used). The warning message should
also indicate the key exposure assumptions on which the risk assessment was based. Id. at
170-71.
341. See id. at 82-83 (which facts are highlighted in a message and how they appear
significantly affects how messages are understood by recipients).
342. Id. at 48-50, 83, 130.
343. Slovic, et al., supra note 134, at 478-79; See PETER M. SANDMAN, U.S. ENVIRON-
MENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, EXPLAINING ENVIRONMENTAL RISK 16 (1986). Another
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8. Copies of warnings and the risk assessments underlying them
should be sent to OEHHA, which should maintain a
central database available to the public3
44
An OEHHA database would enable information-seeking con-
sumers, community residents, and workers to obtain more detailed in-
formation about exposures than that provided on warnings.
Government agencies, environmental organizations, the media and
others could also access this information more easily (as is the case
with EPCRA and the Hot Spots Act).
V
CONCLUSION
Proposition 65's warning provision set forth ambitious goals. It
sought to promote personal choice and informed decisionmaking, and
to satisfy the public's basic right to know. Its drafters envisioned the
statute as a more stringent, alternative regulation that would create
strong incentives for toxics reductions.
To realize all of these far-reaching goals, warnings must attract
attention and effectively communicate information to the public. Yet
the statute itself contains only sparse direction for determining how
warnings should appear. Political opposition has also thwarted regula-
tory implementation of the warning requirement, which has led to in-
adequate regulatory guidance.345 Businesses have exploited the
regulatory ambiguities by providing inconspicuous warnings and unin-
formative warning messages. This is not surprising, since it is not in
their self-interest to fully disclose negative attributes about their prod-
ucts or activities.
Despite the prevalence of poorly designed warnings, the warning
requirement appears to have influenced industry's approach to using
carcinogens and reproductive toxicants, prompting closer business
scrutiny of its products and resulting in increased preventive behavior.
Its reliance on the marketplace has stimulated producers of numerous
study found that consumers more favorably evaluate beef labeled as 75% lean than 25%
fat. Bettman et al., supra note 61, at 65. See generally Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman,
The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice, 211 SCIENCE 453 (1981) (demon-
strating that simple changes in the wording of a decision problem can alter choices made).
344. See Nordenstam & DiMento, supra note 35, at 367 (recommending that
Proposition 65 warnings be provided through telephone sources or libraries, as well as on
product labels and in retail stores); see also Stenzel, supra note 53, at 523-25 (arguing for
provision of more information to analyze risks addressed by Proposition 65); HADDEN,
supra note 7, at 239-42 (recommending that risk information be made available in
computerized data base accessible to the public).
345. See Nordenstam & DiMento, supra note 35, at 373 (Proposition 65 regulations




consumer products, particularly those with available substitutes, to go
beyond the statutory requirements and to slash their use of listed
chemicals. The statute also appears to have prompted reductions in
environmental exposures, although this impact is more difficult to
pinpoint. In the workplace, where an extensive hazard communica-
tion program already exists, the statute has had little impact.
Given the intense anti-regulatory climate prevailing in Congress
and elsewhere, 3 6 information disclosure statutes like Proposition 65
will undoubtedly receive greater attention in the future. These laws
offer something to all sides in the political debate: reliance on market
mechanisms rather than direct regulation; strong indirect incentives to
scale back toxic releases; and powerful appeal to the public's sense of
entitlement to information about toxics in our food, everyday con-
sumer products, neighborhoods, and work environments. The experi-
ence of Proposition 65 to date suggests that such statutes can be a
quick and potent means to stimulate toxics reductions. Warnings must
be carefully devised, however, to achieve the broader goals of promot-
ing informed decisionmaking and individual choice. With these les-
sons in mind, Proposition 65 is an excellent illustration of the
important contribution that information disclosure laws can make to
protect the environment.
346. State and local bodies also have little appetite for extending toxics regulation.
See, e.g., Maria Cone, AQMD Adopts Scaled-Back Pollution Rule, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 9,
1994, at Al (South Coast Air Quality Management District significantly weakened long-
delayed rule regulating existing sources of toxic air contaminants and set the regulatory
threshold at a 1 in 10,000 risk of cancer, despite District estimates that toxic pollutant
emissions total approximately 68 million pounds per year, and that 10,000 persons would
develop cancer as a result of these emissions).
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